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During the 1920s, over repeated dissents by Justices Holmes,
Brandeis, and Stone, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Taft
had been unprecedentedly aggressive in striking down social and
economic regulation.1 In 1930, when Taft resigned, President Hoo-
ver turned naturally to Charles Evans Hughes, who had distin-
guished himself not only as governor of New York and as secretary
of state but also as associate justice from 1910 until 1916.2 In that
capacity, Hughes had tended to vote with Holmes to uphold eco-
nomic regulation, and he had taken a strikingly broad view of the
federal commerce power.3
The sudden death of Justice Sanford later the same year thus
left a Court that could be expected to divide four to four on basic
questions of regulatory authority. As the country slid ever deeper
into depression, and as legislators and executives turned toward in-
creasingly intrusive regulation as an antidote, the question of San-
ford's replacement assumed extraordinary importance.
After liberal senators defeated his first nominee for the crucial
ninth seat,4 President Hoover appointed Owen J. Roberts of Penn-
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This article is part of a
continuing study of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions since 1789. For earlier in-
stallments, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First Hundred
Years 1789-1888 (1985); The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Eco-
nomic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 324 (1985); The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: Full Faith and the Bill of Rights, 1889-1910, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867 (1985); The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1910-1921, 1985 Duke L. J. 1111; The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 Duke L. J. 65.
The author wishes to thank Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner for helpful com-
ments on this paper.
I See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 Duke
L. J. 65.
2 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court- 1910-1921, 1985 Duke
L. J. 1111; Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (1951).
3 See Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes at 660 (cited in note 2), noting progressive oppo-
sition to Hughes's appointment as Chief Justice based largely on his having represented
corporate clients as an attorney: "The strange thing is that men who claimed to be 'liberals'
chose as their target one of the greatest champions of human rights in the current century."
4 Judge John J. Parker of the Fourth Circuit was rejected partly because he had fol-
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sylvania. Having spent virtually his entire career in law practice
and teaching, Roberts was a largely unknown quantity.5 In the
story of the Supreme Court during the 1930s, he was to play a very
important role.'
The story has three chapters and an epilogue. The first chap-
ter is characterized by greater judicial acceptance of social legisla-
tion, over the monolithic objections of Justices Van Devanter, Mc-
Reynolds, Sutherland, and Butler. The path was not straight, but
its direction was unmistakable; the laissez-faire majority of the
1920s had become a minority.7 Both Hughes and Roberts tended
to vote on these matters with Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone; and
when the celebrated state court jurist Benjamin Cardozo took
Holmes's place in 1932, he tended to take his predecessor's posi-
tion, too.
Chapter two lasted only two years, from Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan in 1935 to West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish in 1937.8 In
one of the most dramatic periods in its history, the Court began to
demolish President Roosevelt's New Deal and appeared to revital-
ize substantive limitations on state law as well.9 None of these de-
cisions, perhaps, was actually inconsistent with what the Court had
done before. Several were joined not only by Roberts but by
Hughes as well. The most notorious of them all-the "sick
chicken" case invalidating the National Industrial Recovery
Act-was actually unanimous. 10 Nevertheless, the division of the
Court in other cases left no doubt that both Hughes and (espe-
cially) Roberts were less tolerant of the new legislation than their
earlier decisions seemed to suggest.
lowed Supreme Court precedent in enforcing a yellow dog contract and partly because of his
1920 statement that the "participation of the Negro in politics is a source of evil and danger
to both races and is not desired by the wise men in either race or by the Republican parts of
North Carolina." See Carl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development 776-79
(1943).
5 Roberts had gained some notoriety as special prosecutor in the Teapot Dome cases,
however. See Charles A. Leonard, A Search for a Judicial Philosophy: Mr. Justice Roberts
and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 at 8-10 (1971).
6 Owen Roberts, wrote Professor Fred Rodell, "was for years the most powerful person
in the United States." Nine Men 221 (1955).
7 See Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 163-64 (1960); Edward S.
Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court 44-45 (1934).
* 293 U.S. 388 (1935); 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
* See Benjamin F. Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law ch. 9 (1942);
McCloskey, The American Supreme Court at 165-68 (cited in note 7): "for two busy terms
the Court waged what is surely the most ambitious dragon-fight in its long and checkered
history."
10 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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Chapter three records the famous "switch in time," the re-
markable reversal beginning with the upholding of a minimum
wage law in Parrish and resulting in the virtual abandonment not
only of the judicially created doctrine of substantive due process
but also of the Constitution's own basic principle of limited federal
power.11 These revolutionary changes were cemented by the re-
placement of three of the activist old guard (and of Brandeis and
Cardozo) by representatives of the new order: Hugo Black, Stanley
Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, and Frank Murphy.12
But that was just icing on the cake; the essential change had oc-
curred before any new appointments were made.
These three chapters in the destruction of the old order are
the subject of the present paper. The epilogue-a legacy of deci-
"' See McCloskey, The American Supreme Court at 175-87 (cited in note 7); Wright,
The Growth of American Constitutional Law at ch. 10 (cited in note 9); Edward S. Corwin,
Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. 64-79 (1941).
12
Justices of the Supreme Court During The Time of
Chief Justice Hughes (1930-1941)
1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1902-1932)
Willis Van Devanter (1910-1937)
James C. McReynolds (1914-1941)
Louis D. Brandeis (1916-1939)
George Sutherland (1922-1938)
Pierce Butler (1922-1939)
Harlan F. Stone (1925-1946)
Charles Evans Hughes (1930-1941)
Owen J. Roberts (1930-1945)
Benjamin N. Cardozo (1932-1938) I
Hugo L. Black (1937-1971)
Stanley F. Reed (1938-1957) -
Felix Frankfurter (1939-1962)
William 0. Douglas (1939-1975)
Frank Murphy (1940-1949)
Source: Adapted from Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law, app. B at B-4 to B-6 (11th ed.
1985).
Biographies of these Justices include Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (cited in note 2); Leo-
nard, A Search for a Judicial Philosophy (cited in note 5); George S. Hellman, Benjamin N.
Cardozo: American Judge (1940); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life
(1946); Joel Francis Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland: A Man Against the State (1951); Al-
pheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (1956); Gerald T. Dunne, Hugo
Black and the Judicial Revolution (1977); Helen Shirley Thomas, Felix Frankfurter: Scholar
on the Bench (1960); J. Woodford Howard, Mr. Justice Murphy- A Political Biography
(1968).
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sions expanding civil rights and liberties that foreshadowed the
agenda of the future-will be considered in a subsequent article.
I. THE DAWN OF A NEW DAY?
A. Due Process and Equal Protection
During the 1920s the Court had struck down price regulation
of theater admissions, employment agencies, and gasoline dealers,
strengthening the traditional view that government had no legiti-
mate interest in rectifying the effects of unequal bargaining power
except in a narrowly defined category of businesses "affected with
a public interest."13 Under Chief Justice Hughes, the Court lost
little time in taking a different view.
1. Insurance commissions and chain-store taxes. The first
hint of a more tolerant approach came just a few months after the
new appointments when, in O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., the Court upheld a state law forbidding the payment
of excessive or disuniform commissions to fire insurance agents.1'
As Justice Brandeis emphasized in a brief opinion for the majority,
the Court had already allowed states to regulate the rates charged
to policyholders because the insurance business was affected with a
public interest, and the amounts paid to agents had an obvious
effect on those rates. 15 Thus on the surface the case seemed easy;
even Van Devanter, who had dissented from the earlier decision,
did not deny that insurance was affected with a public interest.16
Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler
nevertheless dissented, arguing that the sole effect of the statute as
construed was to prevent paying agents at different rates, not to
limit their compensation. Thus, "the restrictions have no immedi-
ate or necessary relation" to the cost of insurance; "so far as we
'3 Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (theater admissions); Ribnik v. Mc-
Bride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (employment agencies); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S.
235 (1929) (gasoline dealers). See also Currie, 1986 Duke L. J. at 76-79 (cited in note 1). For
the origins of the public interest requirement, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years 1789-1888 at 370-73 (1985), discussing Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). For the narrow conception of legitimate governmental ends re-
flected in the Taft Court decisions, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 324, 378-82
(1985), discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S 45 (1905); Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1129-
31 (cited in note 2).
" 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
16 Id. at 257, citing German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914), noted in
Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1130 n.96 (cited in note 2).
16 282 U.S. at 266 (Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, dissenting).
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can see, this legislation will afford no protection to those who wish
to insure." 17
The decisive difference between the majority and the dissent
seemed to concern the appropriate level of scrutiny of the relation
between means and ends, and it was brought home by sharply con-
trasting views as to the burden of proof. While the dissenters in-
sisted that the party seeking to sustain the law must show "special
circumstances sufficient to indicate the necessity" for the specific
means chosen, Brandeis concluded that "the presumption of con-
stitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual founda-
tion of record for overthrowing the statute."' s It was this attitude,
more than the result in the particular case, that seemed to augur
an easier time for regulation in the years to come.19
An equal protection decision rendered later in the same term
lent additional force to this expectation. In State Board of Tax
Commissioners v. Jackson, over the same four dissents, Justice
Roberts wrote to uphold a license tax that discriminated against
chain stores. 20 Arguing that the advantages attributed to multiple
stores actually depended upon the size of the business, Suther-
land's dissent tellingly invoked a recent decision invalidating a
taxicab tax that had discriminated against corporations. 2 Roberts,
whose tedious opinion consisted largely of poorly integrated sum-
maries of earlier decisions, went to some lengths to show that no
individual store enjoyed all the advantages of a chain.22 If Roberts
seemed more concerned to show that there was an actual justifica-
tion for the challenged measure than Brandeis had been in the in-
17 282 U.S. at 269-70. The dissenters also argued that the law might actually increase
costs: "in order to operate at all... [in some geographic areas], the insurer may find it
necessary to pay agents much more than prudent management would require [at other local-
ities], and beyond the real value of their services at such [other] places." Unless the result-
ing fee was itself illegal, the nondiscrimination provision would require payment of an in-
flated fee throughout the state. Id. at 270.
Is Id. at 269, 257-58. Brandeis's approach seems more in accord with Justice Chase's
original perception. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171, 174 (1796): "it is unnecessary
...for me to determine, whether this court, constitutionally possesses the power to declare
an act of congress void, on the ground of its being made contrary to. . .the constitution;
but if the court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it, but in a
very clear case." See also Currie, First Hundred Years at 33 (cited in note 13).
19 On the day O'Gorman was decided, wrote Walton Hamilton, "the views of Brandeis"
respecting judicial review in general "became 'the opinion of the court and a new chapter in
judicial history began to be written."' Walton H. Hamilton, The Jurist's Art, 31 Colum. L.
Rev. 1073, 1073 (1931).
20 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
21 Id. at 546-50, citing Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
2 283 U.S. at 534-36.
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surance case, he also appeared quite willing to find one.
2. Ice monopolies and milk prices. That the millennium had
not yet arrived was rudely demonstrated the following term when
both Hughes and Roberts joined Justice Sutherland's opinion in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, striking down a law limiting entry
into the ice business. 23 Unlike cotton ginning, where the Court had
recognized the validity of a similar restriction,24 the ice business
was not, in the majority's view, "charged with a public use."2
Brandeis's monumental dissent, joined by Stone, coupled judicial
restraint with condemnation of wasteful competition, reminded the
reader how far the Court had departed from the Slaughter-House
Cases,26 and closed with the famous description of the states as
"laborator[ies]" able to "try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country. '27
Liebmann's echo of the past was drowned out in 1934 by Jus-
tice Roberts's celebrated fortissimo in Nebbia v. New York, up-
holding minimum milk prices.28 The notion that price and entry
regulations were permissible only in certain businesses affected
with a public interest, Roberts insisted, had been based upon a
misunderstanding of the decision sustaining rate regulation in
Munn v. Illinois.29 "The phrase 'affected with a public interest'
can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that an industry,
for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good." A
court's task, he concluded, was "to determine in each case whether
circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable
exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or
discriminatory."30 This was what Brandeis had said in dissenting
" 285 U.S. 262 (1932). See Pendleton Howard, The Supreme Court and State Action
Challenged Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1931-1932, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 505, 514
(1933), citing Liebmann and intervening decisions invalidating state taxes as casting "con-
siderable doubt" on the thesis that O'Gorman "was portentous of a more tolerant attitude
toward state legislative action challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment."
24 Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
" 285 U.S. at 277.
1 83 U.S 36 (1873) (holding that Louisiana statute giving partial monopoly of the
slaughtering business to one company did not violate the fourteenth amendment).
27 285 U.S. at 285, 292, 303, 311. Holmes had resigned; Cardozo, just appointed, did not
participate. Brandeis attacked the requirement that the regulated business be "affected with
a public interest" as resting upon "historical error": "the true principle is that the State's
power extends to every regulation of any business reasonably required and appropriate for
the public protection." Id. at 302-03. For criticism of the notion of "wasteful" competition,
see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 590-92 (3d ed. 1986).
28 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
29 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
1 291 U.S. at 536.
1987]
The University of Chicago Law Review
from Liebmann, which Roberts did not mention, and it left the
reader wondering how Roberts and Hughes could have gone along
with the contrary decision in that case. 1
Freed from the necessity to demonstrate that the milk busi-
ness was affected with a public interest, Roberts was within easy
reach of his goal. Reciting legislative findings as to the harmful ef-
fects of unrestricted price cutting, he found the challenged mea-
sure not "without relation" to the legitimate "purpose to prevent
ruthless competition from destroying the wholesale price structure
on which the farmer depends for his livelihood, and the commu-
nity for an assured supply of milk." McReynolds and his three
soulmates predictably added an anguished and rambling dissent.32
Economic due process was unmistakably in retreat; both Hughes
and Roberts had come down firmly on the side of tolerance for
economic legislation.3
B. The Contract Clause
Even more dramatic than what the new justices did to sub-
stantive due process in Nebbia was what they had done to the con-
tract clause just a few months earlier in Home Building & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell.34 At the depth of the depression, Minnesota had
passed a law authorizing up to two years' extension of the redemp-
tion period upon foreclosure of preexisting mortgages.3 5 As Suther-
land wrote for the usual four dissenters in'one of his most powerful
opinions, debt extensions in economic crises had been among the
specific evils the clause was designed to prevent, and the Court had
repeatedly struck them down since Bronson v. Kinzie nearly a cen-
tury before." Yet the majority upheld the law in a landmark opin-
ion by Chief Justice Hughes specifically declaring the original un-
31 285 U.S. at 285. Hughes later told his biographer that although he had considered
Liebmann a close case, he thought it reconcilable with Nebbia because in the latter case no
one had been denied the right to sell milk-i.e., the restriction was less intrusive. Roberts
"is said to have paced the floor. . . until the early morning hours" before deciding how to
vote in Nebbia. See Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes at 700 (cited in note 2).
11 291 U.S. at 530 (majority opinion of Roberts), 539-59 (dissent of McReynolds).
3 See Thomas Raeburn White, Constitutional Protection of Liberty of Contract: Does
It Still Exist?, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 425, 440 (1935), lamenting after Nebbia that "the Supreme
Court has in effect surrendered its power to declare void acts of legislature on the ground
that they infringe liberty of contract."
31 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
"I The statute authorized a court to extend the then existing one-year period of re-
demption as necessary.
36 290 U.S. at 448, 453-71, citing, among other cases, Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. 311
(1843). See also Currie, First Hundred Years at 211-13 (cited in note 13).
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derstanding irrelevant: "If by the statement that what the
Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it
is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must
be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the con-
ditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them,
the statement carries its own refutation. '37
Hughes demonstrated at some length that the Court had often
permitted modifications of contract remedies that did not alter the
obligation itself.38 He nowhere said an extension of the redemption
period went only to the remedy, and Bronson had held it did not.
Bronson had also confirmed that even remedial changes were for-
bidden if they "'materially. .. impair[ed] the rights and interests
of the owner,'" as the extension of time seemed clearly to do."
Apart from the matter of remedies, Hughes hastened to add,
"the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vi-
tal interests of its people.. . . [T]he reservation of essential attrib-
utes of sovereign power is. . . read into contracts as a postulate of
the legal order. '40 As evidence, he cited decisions holding that pub-
lic contracts implicitly reserved the power of condemnation,' that
states could not bargain away the power to forbid such arguably
obnoxious activities as lotteries, 42 and, most pertinently, that pri-
vate contracts were subject to later exercises of the police power.43
Nobody had objected when this last proposition was asserted
in an obscure 1905 case involving a promise not to obstruct a
creek, and Blaisdell seemed to show just how sweeping that con-
' 290 U.S. at 442-43. Predictably, the chief justice took refuge in Marshall's oracular
dictum that" 'it is a constitution we are expounding.'" 290 U.S. at 443, quoting McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). For academic approval of the notion that original
meaning is irrelevant, see Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of
Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction (part 5), 27 Cal. L. Rev. 399 (1939). But see
Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703,
735 (1984): "This passage contains some of the most misguided thinking on constitutional
interpretation imaginable." Hughes's further suggestion that the framers might have ap-
proved of the decision had they been aware of "the conditions of the later day," 290 U.S. at
443, was hardly credible in light of Sutherland's demonstration that the clause had been
adopted precisely to prevent debtor relief in times of economic crisis.
33 290 U.S. at 429-34.
11 Bronson, 42 U.S. at 315, quoting Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 17 (1823). Unlike the
extension provision in Bronson, the law in Blaisdell required payment of a reasonable rent
during the period of extension. Nevertheless, as Sutherland observed, it deprived the mort-
gagee of the significant rights of occupancy and sale. 290 U.S. at 480.
'1 290 U.S. at 434-35.
41 Id. at 435-38, citing, for example, West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848).
41 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905). See also Currie, First Hundred Years at
213-15 (cited in note 13); Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 334-35 (cited in note 13).
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clusion had been." One might have argued there was a difference
between a contract to commit murder and one for foreclosure of a
mortgage, but Hughes flatly rejected it, and even the earlier deci-
sion was arguably on the wrong side of the line.45 Subjecting pri-
vate contracts to the police power seemed to reduce the contract
clause to the equivalent of substantive due process. 46
The upshot seemed to be that the mortgage moratorium law
was valid, despite its detrimental impact on the obligation, if it
was "reasonable. '47 If this was the question, the answer was easy:
the relief of debtors in an economic emergency was a legitimate
end and the moratorium a reasonable means of attaining it. "If it
be determined, as it must be, that the contract clause is not an
absolute and utterly unqualified restriction of the State's protec-
tive power, this legislation is clearly so reasonable as to be within
the legislative competency. '48
Precedent may have pointed the way to this conclusion, but
the Court had never before said quite so blatantly that the prohi-
bition of "any. . .law impairing the obligation of contracts" for-
bade only unreasonable impairments.49 One is reminded of the
44 See Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: II, 57 Harv. L.
Rev. 621, 671-74 (1944).
45 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 438-39, dismissing the argument that "state power may be
addressed directly to the prevention of the enforcement of contracts only when these are of
a sort which the legislature in its discretion may denounce as being in themselves hostile to
public morals, or public health, safety or welfare, or where the prohibition is merely of inju-
rious practices." Sutherland's manful effort to tie the police power principle to the estab-
lished doctrine of implied conditions excusing performance on the ground of supervening
illegality fell short of explaining all the precedents. See id. at 475-78 (Sutherland, dissent-
ing); Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., The Contract Clause of the Constitution 211-12 (1938)
(reading precedents to subject contract rights between private persons to police power only
in cases of "unusual public importance").
46 See Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 Harv. L.
Rev. 852, 890-91 (1944) ("there is at least a tendency for the contract clause and the due
process clause to coalesce"). Holmes had pretty well said as much in 1921 in upholding over
four dissents a state law extending housing leases: "contracts are made subject to this exer-
cise of the power of the State when otherwise justifiable, as we have held this [under the due
process clause] to be." Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 198 (1921).
Sutherland properly made no serious effort to distinguish this decision, accurately observing
that the contract clause question there had "received little, if any, more than casual consid-
eration." 290 U.S. at 478-79. Hughes naturally gave it prominent billing. Id. at 440-42.
47 See 290 U.S. at 444: "The principle of this development is. . .that the reservation
of reasonable exercise of the protective power of the State is read into all contracts."
48 Id. at 447.
49 See McCloskey, The American Supreme Court at 164 (cited in note 7): "The idea
appeared to be that the states could now violate the contract clause so long as they were
'reasonable' about it." See also Wright, The Contract Clause at 112 (cited in note 45):
"taken in connection with other decisions. . . interpreting. . . the prohibition. . . [of the
contract] clause, . . . [Blaisdell] appears as merely another step, and not necessarily a long
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scene from Animal Farm in which reexamination of a provision
that "[n]o animal shall drink alcohol" reveals it to outlaw drinking
only "to excess."50
To narrow the text of a constitutional provision on the basis of
its history has a long and respectable pedigree based upon the pre-
mise that the framers' words are only a partial guide to their com-
mand.51 To do so in the teeth of that history seems to give a most
unhappy connotation to Hughes's earlier remark that "the Consti-
tution is what the judges say it is."5 2
C. Federal Powers
Even in Chief Justice Taft's days, the Court had read Con-
gress's power to regulate interstate commerce rather broadly,53 and
in the early 1930s it continued to do so. In Texas & N.O. R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Railway & S.S. Clerks, in 1930, the Court upheld a
provision of the Railway Labor Act protecting the right of rail
one, in the change of that prohibition from an absolute one to a reasonable one."
0 "[A] few days later Muriel, reading over the Seven Commandments to herself, no-
ticed that there was yet another of them which the animals had remembered wrong. They
had thought the Fifth Commandment was 'No animal shall drink alcohol,' but there were
two words that they had forgotten. Actually the Commandment read: 'No animal shall drink
alcohol to excess.'" George Orwell, Animal Farm 120 (illus. ed. 1954) (emphasis in original).
51 See Currie, First Hundred Years at 14-20, 41-49 (cited in note 13), discussing
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
" See Pusey, 1 Charles Evans Hughes at 204 (cited in note 2), quoting the 1907 speech
in which Hughes made this remark and indignantly rejecting the suggestion that Hughes
had meant to "expose[] the solemn function of judging as a sort of humbuggery."
Contemporaneous decisions respecting intergovernmental immunities also reflected a
lenient tendency. See, e.g., Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 391 (1931)
(Stone, over the expected dissents of Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Butler) (upholding a
state corporation tax whose measure included copyright royalties despite an earlier decision
invalidating state taxes laid directly upon patent royalties) (Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142
(1928)) and despite McCallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620 (1929) (which seemed to
reject precedents allowing a state to measure taxes by income it could not tax as such)); Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932) (Hughes) (unanimously overruling Long v. Rock-
wood in holding that, like land granted to a private party by the United States, copyright
royalties themselves were subject to state taxation). The Court demonstrated that it was not
yet prepared to make a very great shift in this field, however, by reaffirming that Congress
could tax neither sales to local governments, Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283
U.S. 570 (1931) (Van Devanter, over dissents by Stone and Brandeis, and with Holmes ac-
quiescing solely on the basis of precedent), nor the income from a state oil lease, Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) (McReynolds, over dissents by Stone, Bran-
deis, Roberts, and Cardozo). Brandeis's opinion in Coronado Oil contains a careful argu-
ment for limiting stare decisis in cases involving application of the Constitution to particu-
lar facts. 285 U.S. at 405-13. For detailed and penetrating analysis of these and later
decisions in this field, see Thomas Reed Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional
Interpretation 118-41(1956).
53 See Currie, 1986 Duke L. J. at 112-14 (cited in note 1).
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workers to choose bargaining representatives, reasoning that "Con-
gress may facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes which
threaten the service of the necessary agencies of interstate trans-
portation. ' 54 Despite the contrary thrust of the twenty-year-old
decision in Adair v. United States,55 which had struck down a ban
on "yellow dog" contracts in the face of a similar argument, no one
dissented .5 The next year, in Arizona v. California, the Court held
that an act providing for construction of Boulder Dam fell within
the power to "regulate commerce .. .among the several states,"
although it involved spending rather than regulation and despite a
plausible argument that the dam would impair rather than pro-
mote navigation.
The most significant relaxation of constitutional obstacles to
the modern administrative state, however, came in Chief Justice
Hughes's 1932 opinion in Crowell v. Benson. The Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, enacted in 1927 to fill
gaps in compensation for injured workers created by decisions lim-
iting state authority over maritime matters, empowered a federal
administrative agency to adjudicate maritime workers' compensa-
tion claims, authorizing the courts to set aside agency orders "not
in accordance with law." "Apart from cases involving constitu-
tional rights," wrote Hughes, "the Act contemplates that, as to
questions of fact ... the findings of the deputy commissioner,
supported by the evidence and within the scope of his authority,
shall be final."'58
Properly disdaining reliance on precedent,59 the Court found
this scheme consistent with article III's command that federal ju-
dicial power be vested in judges with life tenure and irreducible
salary. "[T]here is no requirement that. . . all determinations of
281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930) (Hughes).
55 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (Harlan). See Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 352-53 (cited in note
13).
58 McReynolds did not participate. Texas & N.O. R.R., 281 U.S. at 571. See also Pow-
ell, Vagaries and Varieties at 78 (cited in note 52), arguing that this decision and NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), "clearly annul Mr. Justice Harlan's absurd
commerce clause point in the Adair case."
- 283 U.S. 423 (1931) (Brandeis). McReynolds alone dissented, id. at 464, arguing only
that the case should not be disposed of on a motion to dismiss. See Russell Denison Niles,
Arizona v. California, 10 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev. 188, 194-201 (1932).
58 285 U.S. 22, 39-40, 44, 46 (1932).
59 Earlier cases, as Hughes noted, had allowed Congress to vest civilian adjudicatory
authority within the states in non-article III tribunals only when there was no constitutional
right to judicial proceedings of any kind, as in the payment of government obligations. See
id. at 50-51, discussing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Currie, 1986 Duke L. J.
at 131-34 (cited in note 1).
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fact. . be made by judges"; juries and masters made them all the
time. "[T]he reservation of full authority to the court to deal with
matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial
function in this class of cases."'
In the next section of the opinion, in which he concluded that
"fundamental or 'jurisdictional'" fact findings had to be reviewed
de novo, Hughes neatly refuted his own argument. To permit Con-
gress to "substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial
power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency...
for the final , o+=,,inti,, of-the existence of thfats upon- which
the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend
. . . would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Fed-
eral Constitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic
character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights de-
pend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts." 61 Juries
and masters were distinguishable after all, for the former acted
"under the constant superintendance of the trial judge," and the
latter's reports were "essentially advisory. '82
Hughes was right the second time: review of questions of law
was inadequate to protect the rights of the parties. It was this in-
sight that had led the framers to authorize Congress to establish
lower federal courts. 83 Moreover, as Alexander Hamilton pointed
out, constitutional questions are not the only ones that should be
60 285 U.S. at 51, 54. This conclusion echoed the position Hughes had taken as gover-
nor of New York in 1907 in advocating limited judicial review of public utility commissions.
See Pusey, 1 Charles Evans Hughes at 203-04 (cited in note 2). It did seem to suggest that
article III required judicial review of questions of law decided by non-article III tribunals.
41 285 U.S. at 56-57. The issues held subject to de novo review were whether the injury
occurred on navigable waters and whether the relation of master and servant existed:
"These conditions are indispensable to the application of the statute, not only because the
Congress has so provided explicitly ... but also because the power of the Congress to enact
the legislation turns upon the existence of these conditions." Id. at 55. Related to this con-
clusion was the reaffirmation in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38
(1936) (Hughes, over critical concurrences by Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo), that due pro-
cess required "an independent judicial judgment upon the facts" when administratively pre-
scribed rates were attacked as confiscatory. Id. at 52. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben
Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920), discussed in Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1138 n.140
(cited in note 2); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), discussed in
Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 370-75 (cited in note 13). For the subsequent fate of these
requirements, see Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 636-53 (1965).
62 285 U.S. at 61. One may add that juries are explicitly required by the Constitution,
and are immune from the presidential and congressional pressures that underlie the tenure
and salary provisions.
" Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 822-23 (1824), noting that without
original federal jurisdiction the litigant would have only "the insecure remedy of an appeal
upon an insulated point, after it has received the shape which may be given to it by another
tribunal." See also Currie, First Hundred Years at 93 n.24, 104 (cited in note 13).
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decided without fear of reprisal.6 4 In suggesting that essentially ap-
pellate review of most administrative decisions would satisfy arti-
cle III, the Court seemed to say that the explicit requirements of
tenure and irreducible salary for judges "both of the supreme and
inferior courts" applied only to appellate judges.65
II. DARKNESS AT NOON
By the time 1934 ended, the Court had thus provided strong
evidence of a tendency to relax a variety of preexisting limitations
on social and economic legislation. For anyone who thought the
bad old days were over, however, 1935 was to serve a strong dose of
cold water.
61 "[I]t is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the independence
of the judges may be an essential safeguard." The Federalist Papers No. 78 at 470 (Heir-
loom ed. 1966).
,5 Later commentators have recognized that this, rather than the limited requirement
of de novo review that originally attracted much attention, was the more significant aspect
of the decision. See Jaffe, Judicial Control at 89-90 (cited in note 61); Paul M. Bator et al.,
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 338 (2d ed. 1973). Justice
Brandeis, joined by Stone and Roberts, would have gone even further, permitting Congress
to limit review even of constitutional fact findings, principally because Congress did not
have to create lower federal courts at all: "Matters which may be placed within their juris-
diction may instead be committed to the state courts." 285 U.S. at 86-87. State judges,
however, are not subject to the congressional and presidential pressures that prompted
adoption of the tenure and salary requirements, and allowing them to decide federal cases
serves independent goals of federalism that are absent in the case of federal administrative
agencies. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the
New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 Geo. L. J. 297, 304 (1981); David P. Cur-
rie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 441, 447
(1983).
Two decisions the following year, without citing Crowell, showed there was still life in
article III. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 536 (1933) (Sutherland, over
three dissents), which distinguished the cases upholding territorial courts, such as American
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828), discussed in Currie, First Hundred Years at 119-22
(cited in note 13), on the ground that the territories were "transitory," in holding that arti-
cle III protected salaries of District of Columbia judges from reduction; Williams v. United
States, 289 U.S. 553, 580-81 (1933) (Sutherland, for a unanimous Court), which artificially
concluded that suits brought against the United States with its consent were not article III
cases, in order to reconcile reduction of the salaries of Court of Claims judges with the
principle that article III powers could be exercised only by article III courts: "since Congress
may . . . confer upon an executive officer or administrative board .... or retain for
itself, the power to. . . determine controversies respecting claims against the United States,
it follows indubitably that such power... is no part of the judicial power vested in the
constitutional courts." For precedents less favorable to the independence of the judges, see
Currie, 1986 Duke L. J. at 131-34 (cited in note 1); for apt criticism of the Williams reading
of the jurisdictional clauses of article III, see Bator et al., Hart and Wechsler's Federal
Courts at 398-99.
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A. Delegation and Executive Control
1. Hot oil. The National Industrial Recovery Act was a cen-
terpiece of President Roosevelt's New Deal, a comprehensive shock
treatment designed to cure the economy of its depression. Among
other things, the act authorized the president to prohibit interstate
and foreign transportation of petroleum and its products "pro-
duced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permit-
ted... by any state law." In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the
Court held that the statute unconstitutionally delegated to the
president legislative power vested in Congress by article L"6
The principle the Chief Justice invoked was hoary and re-
spectable, but it had never drawn blood before. Recognizing that
the president's article II responsibility to execute the laws entailed
interstitial policymaking, the Court had upheld a variety of mea-
sures against nondelegation arguments. An executive finding that
one nation respected our neutrality could reactivate an embargo
against another; executive officers could be empowered to set stan-
dards of quality and fitness for imports, to protect national forests
from deterioration, and to raise tariffs to compensate for high du-
ties or low production costs abroad. 7 The decisive factor seemed
to be that in each case Congress had made the basic policy deci-
sion, leaving to the executive only the task of applying a statutory
"primary standard" or "intelligible principle."'8
As Cardozo observed in a lone dissent, the provision at stake
in Panama left the president no latitude whatever once he decided
to act: he was to forbid interstate or foreign commerce in petro-
leum produced in excess of state limitations. In this respect the
law was far more confining than many of those the Court had pre-
viously upheld. 9
What concerned the Court was the absence of any provision
Is 293 U.S. 388 (1935), invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16,
1933, Title I, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933). See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1: "All legislative
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."
'7 See The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. 382, 383 (1813); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470
(1904); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); J.
W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Currie, First Hundred Years
at 118-19 (cited in note 13); Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 339-43 (cited in note 13); Currie,
1986 Duke L. J. at 138 (cited in note 1).
,8 See Buttfield, 192 U.S. at 496; J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 409.
" See 293 U.S. at 434-35. Notwithstanding a lack of persuasive supporting reasons,
precedent had essentially disposed of the argument that by allowing state production quotas
substantially to determine federal policy the statute invalidly delegated congressional power
to the states. See United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 (1919); Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1144
n.167 (cited in note 2).
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limiting the president's discretion whether to act at all: "Section
9(c) does not state whether, or in what circumstances or under
what conditions, the President is to prohibit the transportation of
the amount of petroleum . . . produced in excess of the State's
permission.. . . Congress has declared no policy, has established
no standard, has laid down no rule. '70
Earlier opinions had not emphasized that the provisions they
upheld were mandatory, but Cardozo could not very well deny that
whether to ban commerce in "hot" oil was a fundamental policy
question. Instead, he found elsewhere in the legislation implicit cri-
teria to direct and confine the president in answering it. "[B]y rea-
sonable implication the power conferred upon the President by
§ 9(c) is to be read as if coupled with the words that he shall exer-
cise the power whenever satisfied that by doing so he will effectu-
ate the policy of the statute as theretofore declared"-that is,
when the effect of transporting hot oil "is to promote unfair com-
petition or to waste the natural resources or to demoralize prices or
to increase unemployment or to reduce the purchasing power of
the workers of the nation. 7 1 In declining to follow this path, the
other eight justices seemed to pay little heed to the familiar maxim
that statutes should be construed if possible so as to preserve their
constitutionality. 2
70 293 U.S. at 415, 430.
71 Id. at 438, 437. For a view approving this position, see Jaffe, Judicial Control at 63
(cited in note 61). For the view that the majority was right but that the limits it placed on
delegation were "formal rather than substantial," see Theodore W. Cousens, The Delegation
of Federal Legislative Power to Executive Officials, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 512, 539-40, 544 (1935).
72 See 293 U.S. at 439 (Cardozo, dissenting). For the origins of this venerable principle,
see Currie, First Hundred Years at 29-30 (cited in note 13), discussing Mossman v. Higgin-
son, 4 U.S. 12 (1800).
No limiting construction was thought necessary, on the other hand, to sustain the dele-
gation of authority to the president to prohibit the sale of arms to Bolivia or Paraguay if he
found such a ban "may contribute to the reestablishment of peace between those two coun-
tries." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936). Assuming that such
a delegation would be invalid "if it were confined to internal affairs," Justice Sutherland
properly observed that it was easier to uphold statutes authorizing the president to act in
foreign matters, since the Constitution itself gave him authority in that field "which does
not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress." Id. at 315, 319-20. Similar consid-
erations may support the Court's cavalier conclusion in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1941), that Congress could delegate to the Supreme Court authority to adopt proce-
dural rules with virtually no legislative standards at all. With respect to the authority of
courts to adopt their own procedural rules, see also Currie, First Hundred Years at 117-19
(cited in note 13), discussing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825).
For another interestingly broad view of the president's foreign affairs authority, see
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937) (Sutherland), upholding an executive
agreement whereby the United States succeeded to claims of Russian citizens expropriated
by the Soviet government. As the Court said, the agreement was incidental to United States
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Since the defect the Court had perceived could be mended by
a more definitive assertion of congressional will, and since the
opinion had been joined by such tolerant justices as Brandeis and
Stone, the decision did not necessarily display hostility toward reg-
ulation as such, or even toward federal regulation." Nevertheless it
portended rough sailing for other and more important New Deal
provisions.
2. Sick chickens. Four months later, in Schechter Corp. v.
United States, the Court applied the same doctrine to cut the
heart out of the statute whose extremities the Panama decision
had already amputated. Schechter had been prosecuted for violat-
ing a "code of fair competition," promulgated by the President for
the poultry business under section 3 of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, by failing to comply with the code's minimum wage
and maximum hour provisions and by selling "an unfit chicken. '74
The only flaw in the provision nullified in Panama, wrote
Chief Justice Hughes, had been the breadth of presidential discre-
tion in determining whether or not to act. In Schechter the diffi-
culty was "more fundamental": there was no "adequate definition
of the subject to which the codes [we]re to be addressed." 75 Apart
from antimonopoly and hearing provisions and a requirement that
trade associations proposing codes to the president be "representa-
tive," the president's discretion in this regard was "virtually unfet-
tered." Unlike the "unfair methods of competition" forbidden by
the Federal Trade Commission Act, codes of "fair competition"
were not limited to anything resembling the established common
law. "Rather, the purpose is clearly disclosed to authorize new and
controlling prohibitions through codes of laws which would em-
brace what the formulators would propose, and what the President
recognition of that government and the establishment of diplomatic relations; it could there-
fore plausibly fit within the president's apparently innocuous authority to "receive Ambas-
sadors," art. II, § 3, which Sutherland did not mention. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional
Law 368 (11th ed. 1985). More serious was the objection that the treaty clause of article II
required Senate consent; in holding that not every "international compact" was a "treaty"
without specifying which ones were (compare the distinction in art. I, § 10 between state
"treaties" that are absolutely forbidden and "compacts" that Congress may approve), the
Court seemed to risk erosion of the Senate's constitutional authority. See Raoul Berger, The
Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 33-48 (1972); Philip B.
Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 Duke L. J. 619, 626.
73 Indeed Congress remedied the defect within six weeks by forbidding interstate
transportation of hot oil outright. Connally Hot Oil Act, 49 Stat. 30 (1935). See Robert L.
Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645,
658 (1946).
74 295 U.S. 495, 521-22, 528 (1935).
75 Id. at 530-31.
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would approve, or prescribe, as wise and beneficient [sic] measures
for the government of trades and industries in order to bring about
their rehabilitation, correction and development. '7 6
This time the decision was unanimous, and rightly so. As Car-
dozo noted in a concurring opinion joined by Stone, the power con-
veyed was "as wide as the field of industrial regulation ...
[A]nything that Congress may do within the limits of the com-
merce clause for the betterment of business may be done by the
President . . . by calling it a code. This is delegation running
riot. '7 7 It would no doubt have been impolitic to say so, but it can
hardly have escaped the justices that apart from its limitation to
business there was little to distinguish what Congress had at-
tempted from the 1933 legislation authorizing Adolf Hitler to gov-
ern Germany by decree.7 8 Far from reflecting hostility to federal
regulation as such, the delegation decision in Schechter was a salu-
tary reminder of the wisdom of the framers' decision to vest legis-
lative power in a representative assembly.79
3. Coal miners. The codes of fair competition in Schechter
had been formulated by private trade associations and approved
by the President. The requirement of presidential approval made
it unnecessary to decide whether a delegation of legislative author-
ity to private persons also would be unconstitutional, 0 but the
opinion left no doubt that it would: "[W]ould it be seriously con-
tended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to
trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to
enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabil-
itation and expansion of their trade or industries? . . The answer
is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our
"8 Id. at 533-35, 537. For a prediction that the precedents could sustain even this dele-
gation, see Forrest Revere Black, The National Industrial Recovery Act and the Delegation
of Legislative Power to the President, 19 Cornell L. Q. 389 (1934).
71 295 U.S. at 553.
78 GB1. 1933, Teil I, S. 141: "Reichsgesetze kinnen ausser in dem in der Reichsverfas-
sung vorgesehenen Verfahren auch durch die Reichsregierung beschlossen werden." ["Impe-
rial statutes may be enacted not only by the procedure provided for in the Constitution of
the Empire, but also by the Imperial Executive."] For a glimpse of the delegation issue in
modern Germany through American eyes, see David P. Currie, Der Vorbehalt des Gesetzes:
Amerikanische Analogien, in G6tz, Klein, & Starck, Die 6ffentliche Verwaltung zwischen
Gesetzgebung und richterlicher Kontrolle 68 (1985).
" See also David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers after Bowsher, 1986 S.Ct. Rev.
19, 21-31.
80 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 552 (Cardozo, concurring): "The[ir] function is strictly
advisory; it is the imprimatur of the President that begets the quality of law.. . . When the
task that is set before one is that of cleaning house, it is prudent as well as usual to take
counsel of the dwellers."
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law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives
and duties of Congress. ' '
The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, another New
Deal measure, presented the question thus previewed in Schechter.
Congress had provided in effect that minimum wages and maxi-
mum hours agreed upon by a preponderance of coal miners and
producers should bind the entire industry.8 2 Speaking through Jus-
tice Sutherland in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. in 1936, the Court
lived up to its promise: "The power conferred upon the majority is,
in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority.
This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is
not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively
disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and
often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business."
Regulation was "necessarily a governmental function," and a stat-
ute attempting to confer regulatory power on private persons was
"so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded
by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is un-
necessary to do more than refer to decisions of this court which
foreclose the question." 83
Cited for this proposition were not only Schechter, but also
two earlier decisions striking down state laws found to have dele-
gated lawmaking authority to private parties.84 This was not neces-
sarily to condemn lawmaking by initiative or referendum, whose
constitutionality the Court had refused on political question
grounds to determine.8 5 The democratic nature of these processes
adequately distinguishes them from measures conferring legislative
authority on particular interest groups.86 But the Court's invoca-
s' Id. at 537.
*' See Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 402, § 4 pt. III(g), 49
Stat. 991, 1002.
83 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
" See Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912); Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116, 121-22 (1928). See Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1138 n.140 (cited in note 2). See also
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194 (1936) (Suth-
erland), distinguishing Eubank, Roberge, and Carter in upholding a statute creating a pri-
vate right of action to recover damages resulting from sales lower than those fixed by "fair
trade" (resale price maintenance) agreements to which the defendant need not be a party:
"Here, the restriction, already imposed with the knowledge of appellants, ran with the ac-
quisition [of the goods] and conditioned it."
85 Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See also Currie, 1985 Duke L.
J. at 1117 n.37 (cited in note 2).
"' See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 675 (1976), up-
holding a requirement that zoning changes be approved by referendum: the nondelegation
doctrine "is inapplicable where, as here, rather than. . . a delegation of power, we deal with
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tion of due process rather than article I to support its convincing
conclusion did seem to call into question earlier suggestions that
the separation of powers at the state level was of no federal con-
cern. For Carter reminds us that due process traditionally meant
the executive could act only in accordance with the "law of the
land"; the policy behind that prohibition forbids the executive as
well as the coal industry to make basic policy.87
4. Trade commissioners. William E. Humphrey was a mem-
ber of the Federal Trade Commission, appointed by President
Hoover for a seven-year term and removable by the president "for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." In
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, the Court held that Presi-
dent Roosevelt had acted unlawfully in removing Humphrey for
policy reasons before his term expired.""
In Myers v. United States, a few years before, the Taft Court
had ringingly held that a statutory requirement of Senate consent
to discharge a postmaster impaired the president's article II con-
trol over executive functions.8 9 This principle, wrote Justice Suth-
erland for a unanimous Court in Humphrey's Executor, was inap-
plicable to the trade commission because it was not an executive
agency. "In administering the provisions of the statute in respect
of 'unfair methods of competition'-that is to say in filling in and
administering the details embodied by that general standard-the
commission acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judi-
cially. . . . To the extent that it exercises any executive func-
tion-as distinguished from executive power in the constitutional
sense-it does so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial powers, or as an agency of the legisla-
tive or judicial departments of the government."90
This was quite remarkable. Previous decisions had upheld
delegations of apparently legislative or judicial powers to adminis-
a power reserved by the people to themselves."
87 See Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 339-40 n.91 (cited in note 13), and cases cited
therein; Currie, First Hundred Years at 272 (cited in note 13). Nevertheless, the Court
unanimously refused, the year after Carter, to reexamine its conclusion regarding separation
of powers at the state level. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937)
(Cardozo): "How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is
commonly, if not always, a question for the state itself."
88 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Strictly speaking, the holding was that Humphrey was entitled
to his continuing salary. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 S. Ct. Rev. 41,
93-95, arguing for this reason that the decision is not a firm precedent for congressional
authority to limit the power of removal.
89 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See also Currie, 1986 Duke L. J. at 134-38 (cited in note 1).
80 Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628.
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trative officers on the ground that the executive function itself em-
braced the elaboration and application of legislative policy. 1 To
deny that the commission's powers were executive was to demon-
strate that they could be exercised only by Congress or by the
courts.
Even if the Court was right that giving content to the statu-
tory command in deciding cases was not an executive function, the
same hardly could be said of the commission's authority to file
complaints against offenders. Prosecution is neither legislation nor
adjudication but rather a quintessential means of law enforce-
ment.9 2 If the president cannot control the prosecutor, he cannot
fulfill his constitutional duty to "take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed."9 " The message of Humphrey's Executor thus
seemed to be that Congress could violate article II if it was willing
to violate articles I and III at the same time, as well as the separa-
tion of powers. 4
11 See, e.g., notes 71-73 and accompanying text above (discussing Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856) (extra-
judicial distraint procedure held consistent with article III as an executive function); Ex
parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929) (executive officers may adjudicate "matters
...which from their nature do not require judicial determination and yet are susceptible of
it"). Humphrey's Executor itself described the Commission as "an administrative body cre-
ated by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute." 295 U.S.
at 628. See also Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3192 (1986): "Interpreting a law enacted
by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the
law."
,1 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109-43 (1976), holding that because, among other
things, their prosecutorial duties were executive, members of the Federal Election Commis-
sion were "Officers of the United States" who consequently could not be appointed by
Congress.
13 U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. Hughes himself had made a similar argument at the policy
level in arguing for gubernatorial removal of bungling members of public service commis-
sions in 1907. See Pusey, 1 Charles Evans Hughes at 202-03 (cited in note 2). Unlike the
provision condemned in Myers, and like the one Hughes had advocated in 1907, the provi-
sion upheld in Humphrey's Executor permitted the president to discharge a trade commis-
sioner for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Humphrey's Executor, 295
U.S. at 620. Since one of the principal goals of the legislation had been to create a commis-
sion independent of the president, however, one could not very well twist these restrictive
terms to make the failure to follow presidential orders a ground for removal. See 295 U.S. at
624-26, summarizing the legislative history.
" See Currie, 1986 S. Ct. Rev. at 31-36 (cited in note 79). The principle that the same
person may not be both prosecutor and judge also is reflected in the concept that due pro-
cess requires fundamentally fair procedure. See also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927) (holding that a judge may not be compensated only when he convicts defendants);
Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland ch. 3 (McKibbin ed. 1899). For a compre-
hensive contemporaneous assessment of Humphrey's Executor, see Robert E. Cushman,
The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 24 Cornell L. Q. 13,
163 (1938).
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B. The Commerce Power
The nondelegation doctrine only forbade Congress to transfer
its authority to others; it cast no doubt on the validity of congres-
sional regulation. Both Schechter and Carter, however, also made
clear that Congress itself could not have enacted the challenged
measures, and a third decision rendered shortly before Schechter
had taken a still more restrictive view.
1. Schechter. The defendants bought live poultry, slaugh-
tered it, and sold it to local retailers. Most of the poultry came
from other states. However, as the Court in Schechter said, the
interstate journey ended when the birds reached the slaughter-
house: "Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were
transactions in interstate commerce. '95
The government argued that the wages and hours of
slaughterhouse employees and the quality of birds sold affected in-
terstate commerce by influencing the price, quantity, and quality
of poultry shipped from one state to another.9 6 Chief Justice
Hughes, who had written two of the principal decisions on which
this argument was based, agreed that Congress had some power to
protect interstate commerce from "injury . . .due to the conduct
of those engaged in intrastate operations. '9 7 If Congress could reg-
ulate everything affecting commerce, however, "there would be vir-
tually no limit to the federal power and for all practical purposes
we should have a completely centralized government."98
96 295 U.S. at 543, citing, among others, Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885) (up-
holding state tax on goods after interstate transportation). See Currie, First Hundred Years
at 414 n.78 (cited in note 13).
" 295 U.S. at 508-10. See Stern, 59 Harv. L. Rev. at 660 (cited in note 73), concluding
that the record respecting any such effects was "meagre" and that "a sounder argument"
was the more sweeping one "that depressed business conditions had catastrophically af-
fected all commerce, including interstate, and that a possible remedy was to increase the
purchasing power of all wage earners through wage and hour regulation, thereby increasing
the demand for products to be shipped in commerce." This argument, Stern conceded, "had
...little chance of success in the judicial climate of that period." Id. at 661.
91 295 U.S. at 544, citing, among others, Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States
(Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (Hughes) (federal regulation of local rail rates
in competition with interstate traffic). See also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Int. Com. Comm.,
221 U.S. 612, 619 (1911) (Hughes) (federal limitation of hours worked in local commerce by
employee also engaged in interstate commerce); Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1118-21 (cited in
note 2).
98 295 U.S. at 548. See also Forrest Revere Black, The Commerce Clause and the New
Deal, 20 Cornell L. Q. 169, 179 (1935): "Since the depression seriously obstructs the flow of
commodities in interstate commerce, it follows that measures reasonably calculated to free
business from the burdens of the depression are regulations which will protect and foster
interstate commmerce." See generally Thomas Reed Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and
Codes, II, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1935).
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This was true, and it was refreshing to see the Court acknowl-
edge it, for in some of their more recent pronouncements the jus-
tices had tended to emphasize the effect on commerce without
much attention to whether their decision left anything outside the
enumeration of limited federal powers.9  Cardozo put the point
with his accustomed elegance in an emphatic concurring opinion:
"If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the
forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our
federal system."'100
As always, it was easier to declare that there were limits than
to explain why the particular case lay beyond them. Hughes re-
curred to the tired distinction between "direct" and "indirect" ef-
fects on commerce without satisfactorily distinguishing earlier de-
cisions.101 Cardozo abandoned the illusive quest for objective
criteria altogether, stressing that "[t]he law [was] not indifferent to
considerations of degree" and concluding without elaboration that
"[t]o find immediacy or directness here is to find it almost
everywhere.' 10 2
The candid imprecision of Cardozo's approach reflects the
subjective nature of the problem. Surely too, he and all his col-
leagues were right on the facts of the case: to permit Congress to
regulate the wages and hours in a tiny slaughterhouse because of
remote effects on interstate commerce would leave nothing for the
tenth amendment to reserve.
2. Carter. Five justices thought Schechter governed the com-
merce clause question in Carter. Coal mining was production, not
commerce; Congress could no more regulate what preceded inter-
state trade than what followed it. Any impact of low wages or long
hours in the mining industry on commerce, moreover, was "indi-
rect." It mattered not that the companies involved were large and
the effect on commerce great: "The word 'direct'. . . connotes the
absence of an efficient intervening agency or condition. . . . The
distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon
" See Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1118-21 (cited in note 2), and cases there discussed.
100 295 U.S. at 554.
101 Id. at 546-48. Contrast with the finding of indirectness in Schechter, Baltimore &
Ohio. R.R. v. Int. Com. Comm., 221 U.S. 612 (1911) (hours worked locally by employee also
engaged in interstate commerce); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911)
(couplers on intrastate cars); Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (intrastate rail
rates). See Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 346-49 (cited in note 13); Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at
1118-21 (cited in note 2). For criticism of Hughes's distinction, see E. S. Corwin, The
Schechter Case-Landmark, or What?, 13 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 151, 162-70 (1936).
102 295 U.S. at 554. See also Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928)
(Holmes, dissenting): "most of the distinctions of the law are distinctions of degree."
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the magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but entirely upon
the manner in which the effect has been brought about.' 1 03 Thus
Congress itself could not set minimum wages or maximum hours
for coal miners.
While the result was the same as in Schechter, the tone of the
opinion in Carter was quite different. Conspicuously missing from
Carter was Hughes's insistence that Congress had power to pre-
vent harm to commerce regardless of its source. In accents reminis-
cent of the discredited decision in United States v. E. C. Knight
Co.,104 Sutherland seemed to consider his job essentially done once
he had laboriously established the obvious proposition that mining
was not itself interstate commerce. 0 5
In a separate opinion, Hughes agreed that the labor provisions
went "beyond any proper measure of protection of interstate com-
merce." However, following the analysis he had employed in
Schechter, he suggested that additional provisions setting mini-
mum prices for local coal sales might be permissible in order to
prevent discrimination against interstate commerce. Cardozo's dis-
sent, joined by Brandeis and Stone, went further: "Within rulings
the most orthodox, the prices for intrastate sales of coal have so
inescapable a relation to those for interstate sales that a system of
regulation for transactions of the one class is necessary to give ade-
quate protection to the system of regulation adopted for the
other."' 0 6
Both Hughes and Cardozo relied on the Shreveport Rate
Case, which had upheld federal regulation of local rail rates. The
citation was apt; the provisions in both cases prevented the loss of
substantial interstate business to local competition. Finding the
price and labor provisions inseparable, the majority nullified the
price provisions without considering their merits. 0 7 Cardozo, on
103 Carter, 298 U.S. at 307-08. See the government's ingenious argument that the enu-
merated powers should be construed in light of Randolph's initial proposal to authorize
Congress "to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legisla-
tion." Id. at 257-58 (oral argument of Mr. Dickenson). This argument, which had been de-
veloped in Robert L. Stern, That Commerce which Concerns More States than One, 47
Harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1338-40 (1934), was not easy to reconcile with the Convention's rejection
of that proposal in favor of an enumeration. Carter, 298 U.S. at 292.
104 156 U.S. 1 (1895). See also Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 346-49 (cited in note 13).
105 298 U.S. at 297-310.
06 Id. at 320 (Hughes), 329 (Cardozo).
107 298 U.S. at 312-16. The Court reached this conclusion despite a clause explicitly
providing that "[i]f any provision of this Act. . .is held invalid, the remainder of the Act
...shall not be affected thereby." For the obvious objections, see the separate opinions of
Hughes and Cardozo, 298 U.S. at 321-24, 334-38; Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separa-
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the other hand, found the challenge to the labor provisions un-
ripe.108 The majority thus struck down one provision; the dissent-
ers voted to uphold another.
If precedent was to be respected, the difficult question in
Carter was whether the effect of the labor provisions was more like
that of the rate regulation upheld in Shreveport or that of similar
wage and hour rules struck down in Schechter. In Sutherland's
terms, it was arguable that the effect of wages on commerce was
always more indirect than that of prices. Low local prices attract
customers away from interstate markets; low wages reduce produc-
tion costs and thus tend to lower prices.109 On the other hand,
wages paid by huge coal companies clearly have a greater impact
on commerce than those paid by a diminutive butcher, and there
was no compelling reason for Sutherland's conclusion that the
magnitude of the effect had to be ignored. Hughes, the only justice
to comment on both the price and the labor provisions, did not say
why he found one more acceptable than the other.10
Cardozo pointed out once again that it was a mistake to at-
tempt to encompass the governing principle in the single adjective
"direct": "Strictly speaking, the intrastate rates [in cases like
Shreveport] have a primary effect upon the intrastate traffic and
not upon any other, though the repercussions of the competitive
system may lead to secondary consequences affecting interstate
traffic also.. . . At times, as in [Schechter], the waves of causation
will have radiated so far that their undulatory motion, if discern-
ible at all, will be too faint or obscure, too broken by cross-cur-
rents, to be heeded by the law. In such circumstances the holding
is not directed at prices or wages considered in the abstract, but at
prices or wages in particular conditions." 1 One regrets that Car-
dozo did not have the opportunity to show how this unavoidably
bility Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76 (1937). That Congress had meant
what it said was suggested by its prompt reenactment of the price provisions, see Bitumi-
nous Coal Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 48, § 4 pt. 11 50 Stat. 72, which were upheld over Mc-
Reynolds's dissent in Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
105 298 U.S. at 324.
0. The effect of wages paid in processing goods that are to be shipped or have been
shipped from one state to another, however, may be thought more "direct" than that of
wages paid in connection with competing local goods.
110 Hughes's biographer, who paints the chief justice as a consistent supporter of broad
federal authority, says he objected to the labor provisions "chiefly" on delegation grounds.
Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes at 746 (cited in note 2). But the opinion flatly added that
"[t]he provision goes beyond any proper measure of protection of interstate commerce and
attempts a broad regulation of industry within the State." 298 U.S. at 318-19.
'" 298 U.S. at 327-28. "Perhaps," he added, "if one group of adjectives is to be chosen
in preference to another, 'intimate' and 'remote' will be found to be as good as any."
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subjective test applied to minimum wages and maximum hours for
coal miners.
3. Alton Railroad. Carter may have been a borderline case
after Shreveport, but Sutherland's emphasis on the distinction be-
tween production and commerce seemed to cast doubt on Shreve-
port itself. More startling still was the split decision in Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. that Congress could not establish
a retirement and pension system even for railroad workers indispu-
tably engaged in interstate commerce. 112
As Hughes argued for four justices in dissent, a long series of
decisions had upheld regulations touching interstate railroading.
"[N]othing which has a real or substantial relation to the suitable
maintenance of [rail] service, or to the discharge of the responsibil-
ities which inhere in it," they argued, "can be regarded as beyond
the power of [congressional] regulation. 11 3 Pension plans could
reasonably be found to promote transportation by encouraging re-
tirement of superannuated employees, reducing wage costs attribu-
table to seniority, and improving worker morale.1 14
For the majority, Roberts applied an extremely sharp scalpel
to these arguments. The fact that railroads were becoming safer as
their workers aged showed that pensions had no effect on safety,
and in any event the railroads could retire overage workers without
pension. Retirement was irrelevant to cost because pay did not in-
crease with seniority, and morale could not be considered without
abandoning all limits on federal power.115
Not all of this reasoning was logically flawed.11 6 The level of
scrutiny it reflected, however, was at opposite poles from the test
of necessity and propriety of federal legislation that Marshall had
112 295 U.S. 330 (1935), criticized in Thomas Reed Powell, Commerce, Pensions, and
Codes, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1935).
113 295 U.S. at 376 (Hughes, joined by Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, dissenting). An
example of the decisions upholding regulations affecting interstate railroading is Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 342-54 (1904) (upholding federal antitrust
prosecution for creation of holding company eliminating competition between two interstate
railroads). See also the railroad cases discussed in Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1118-21 (cited
in note 2), and in the Alton R.R. opinions; and see also the irreverent suggestion in Powell,
Vagaries and Varieties at 42 (cited in note 52) that after Alton R.R. "[i]t is a regulation of
interstate commerce to help railroads but not to help railroad employees."
:14 295 U.S. at 378-80.
"I Id. at 362-71. The majority added that workers' compensation was distinguishable
because it created an incentive to safety. Id. at 370.
"' The last argument was refuted by the fact that the measure was confined to an
interstate industry, and the increase in safety attributable to technological advances did not
disprove the self-evident risks created by elderly workers.
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laid down in the national bank case.117 The tenor of the opinion
was inconsistent not only with the judicial restraint exercised with
Roberts's concurrence in reviewing insurance regulation in
O'Gorman, but also with Roberts's own sympathetic search for de-
batable bases on which to uphold the chain store tax in Jackson. s18
Schechter was an obvious case, and Carter may have been
right even after Shreveport. But one would have to go back to the
1908 decision forbidding Congress to protect the union rights of
interstate rail workers 1 to find another decision in which the com-
merce clause was so grudgingly construed as in Alton Railroad.20
C. Taxing and Spending
1. Taxation as regulation. In the Child Labor Tax Case in
1922, the Court had invalidated a federal tax as a pretext for regu-
lating a subject Congress could not regulate directly.1 2' In 1935 and
1936 the Court invalidated two more.
One of these was in Carter. The Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act imposed a 15 percent gross receipts tax but largely ex-
empted producers who adhered to the wage and price standards.
"It is very clear," wrote Sutherland, "that the 'excise tax' is not
imposed for revenue but exacted as a penalty to compel compli-
ance with the regulatory provisions of the act. 1 22  No justice took
issue with this conclusion, and the prohibitive nature of the exac-
tion supports it. Sutherland did not try to distinguish McCray v.
United States, which had upheld an equally prohibitive federal tax
11 See Currie, First Hundred Years at 160-65 (cited in note 13), discussing McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
118 Though different constitutional provisions were involved in these cases, Roberts ac-
knowledged in Alton R.R. that, as Justice Harlan had established many years before, see
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), discussed in Currie, First Hundred Years at
375-77 (cited in note 13), the due process and necessary and proper clauses both required
that legislation be an appropriate means to a legitimate end. 295 U.S. at 347-48 n.5.
'I Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908), discussed in Currie, 52 U. Chi. L.
Rev. at 352-53 (cited in note 13).
120 See Osmond K. Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1934 Term,
84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 345, 351 (1936), arguing that Alton R.R. "will probably rank with Lochner
v. New York and Adkins v. Children's Hospital as high-water marks of reaction."
121 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating 10 percent excise tax on employers of child labor),
discussed in Currie, 1986 Duke L. J. at 110-12 (cited in note 1). See also Hill v. Wallace, 259
U.S. 44 (1922) (invalidating tax on grain futures as impermissible effort at regulation).
"I1 See 298 U.S. at 280-81, 289. See also id. at 289 ("The whole purpose of the exaction
is to coerce what is called an agreement-which, of course, it is not, for it lacks the essential
element of consent. One who does a thing in order to avoid a monetary penalty does not
agree; he yields to compulsion precisely the same as though he did so to avoid a term in
jail.").
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on yellow margarine. 123
The year before, in United States v. Constantine, the Court
had struck down a federal excise tax on persons selling liquor in
violation of state law. That the tax singled out criminals and that
the amount was forty times that levied on lawful dealers, wrote
Justice Roberts, showed that "the purpose [was] to impose a pen-
alty as a deterrent and punishment of unlawful conduct." Cardozo,
joined by Brandeis and Stone, argued in dissent that the higher
profits and enforcement costs associated with illegal activities af-
forded plausible reasons of revenue policy for the discrimination
and protested that the Court's search for Congress's true motive
had extended "the process of psychoanalysis ... to unaccustomed
fields., 124
Even the Child Labor Tax Case had confirmed, as Cardozo
argued, that an "incidental motive" to influence conduct immune
from federal regulation did not condemn otherwise permissible
taxes as pretextual; incentives are unavoidable in any tax sys-
tem. 1 25 In the past the Court had been unduly reluctant to look
behind federal taxes even when they appeared to serve no legiti-
mate federal purpose.126 Since nothing of the sort could be said of
a $1,000 tax on an illegal liquor business, Constantine seemed to
go too far in the opposite direction.12 7
2. Federal grants. In Carter and Constantine, Congress had
attempted to use taxation as a stick to discourage undesirable con-
duct it could not forbid. In United States v. Butler, it attempted
to use federal grants as carrots to encourage desirable conduct it
could not require.1 28
In an effort to reduce surpluses that diminished farm income,
the Agricultural Adjustment Act authorized the secretary of agri-
culture to subsidize farmers who agreed to limit their production.
Only Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo voted to sustain the statute,
.2 195 U.S. 27 (1904), discussed in Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 356-57 (cited in note
13).
124 296 U.S. 287, 295, 297-99 (1935).
13 See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38; Constantine, 296 U.S. at 297-98 (Car-
dozo, dissenting); Robert E. Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxa-
tion, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 759, 764 (1934).
12$ See McCray, 195 U.S. 27 (prohibitive tax on colored margarine); United States v.
Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) ($1 annual tax on persons engaged in the production or distri-
bution of narcotics), discussed in Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1124-25 (cited in note 2).
127 See Osmond K. Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1935 Term,
85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 27, 29 (1936): Constantine "marked a departure from earlier cases which
had refused to test taxes by their motives."
12s 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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and Roberts wrote for the majority.129
Roberts has been widely pilloried for commencing his discus-
sion with the statement that the Court's task was simply "to lay
the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with
the former."1 0 This unfelicitous choice of words suggested a
mechanical conception of judicial review inconsistent with the
open-endedness of the text. Yet Roberts did not deny that the task
required the exercise of judicial judgment. The point he was trying
to make was a worthy and important one: "This court neither ap-
proves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate and diffi-
cult office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is in
accordance with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the
Constitution." 131
The only constitutional provision invoked to support the stat-
ute was the opening clause of article I, section 8, which authorizes
Congress "[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States. 1 3 2 The text can be read to confer
one power or four: "to pay the debts. . ." might mean "and to pay
the debts. . ." or "in order" to do so. The structure and history of
the Constitution, however, had persuaded even so zealous a nation-
alist as Story that the clause did not give Congress an independent
power to "provide for the. . . general Welfare." The Court unani-
mously agreed: such a construction would make "'the government
of the United States . . ., in reality, a government of general and
unlimited powers, notwithstanding the subsequent enumeration of
"' The suit was brought by receivers of a corporation that had been assessed a special
processing tax to pay for the grants. Taxpayer standing to challenge expenditures in general
had been denied in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), because the impact of
spending upon the taxpayer was so tenuous. See Currie, 1986 Duke L. J. at 122-24 (cited in
note 1). Butler presented no such difficulty. Since the processing tax was earmarked for the
subsidies under attack, if there were no spending there would be no tax either. See 297 U.S.
at 57-61.
130 297 U.S. at 62. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 90 (2d
ed. 1986); Vincent M. Barnett, Jr.; Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Self-Restraint,
39 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 217 (1940); Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval 458
(1960) ("slot-machine theory of jurisprudence"); Powell, Vagaries and Varieties at 42-43
(cited in note 52) ("Try as I will, I cannot bring myself to admire both the candor and the
capacity of the men who write such things to be forever embalmed in the official law
reports.").
131 297 U.S. at 63. See id. at 63 ("The only power ... [the Court] has, if such it may be
called, is the power of judgment.").
1S The United States did not contend that the act was a valid exercise of the com-
merce power. Id. at 64.
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specific powers.' . . . [T]he only thing granted is the power to tax
for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation's
debts and making provision for the general welfare.''
1 33
This authority to tax and spend for the general welfare, how-
ever, was not, as Madison had asserted, "confined to the enumer-
ated legislative fields committed to Congress.' 1 34 Such an interpre-
tation, Roberts argued, would make the general welfare provision
"mere tautology, for taxation and appropriation are or may be nec-
essary incidents of the exercise of any of the enumerated legislative
powers." Thus, as Hamilton and Story had argued, "Congress...
has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by
the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the gen-
eral welfare of the United States" and not "by the direct grants of
legislative power found in the Constitution.' 3 5
It seemed to follow from this conclusion, as Justice Stone ar-
gued in dissent, that in a nationwide agricultural depression "the
expenditure of public money in aid of farmers" was one for "the
general welfare" of the United States.13' Significantly, Roberts did
133 Id. at 64, quoting Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States § 907 (1833). For the same position, see Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of
Congress-Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 548, 551 (1923), reprinted in Rich-
ard Loss, ed., 1 Corwin on the Constitution 246, 248 (1981).
"34 See Butler, 297 U.S. at 64.
... Id. at 65, 65-66. See Alexander Hamilton, 1791 Report on the Subject of Manufac-
tures (1791), reprinted in Harold C. Syrett, ed., 10 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 230, 302-
04 (1966); Story, 1 Commentaries at ch. 14 (cited in note 133); Corwin, 36 Harv. L. Rev. at
550-80, reprinted in Loss, ed., 1 Corwin on the Constitution at 249-69 (cited in note 133).
Hughes later wrote that he considered this broad interpretation "the most 'significant and
important ruling in the Butler case.'" See Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes at 743 (cited in
note 2). In agreement is John W. Holmes, The Federal Spending Power and State Rights, 34
Mich. L. Rev. 637, 637 (1936) which argues that Butler "point[ed] the way toward unprece-
dented expansion of federal functions."
136 297 U.S. at 79. The refusal of an early Congress to provide disaster relief for a single
community after debate had raised serious constitutional doubts tends to support Hamil-
ton's insistence that "the object to which an appropriation of money is. . . made [must] be
General and not local; its operation extending in fact, or by possibility, throughout the
Union, and not being confined to a particular spot." Syrett, ed., 10 Papers of Hamilton at
303 (cited in note 135) (emphasis in original). See also 6 Annals of Congress 1712-27 (1796).
Story, who agreed with Hamilton's conclusion, added that expenditures for foreign palaces
or for "propagating Mahometanism among the Turks . . . would be wholly indefensible
upon constitutional principles." Story, 1 Commentaries at § 922 (cited in note 133). In fact,
even foreign and local conditions may affect the general welfare; modern foreign aid, for
example, is not entirely eleemosynary. In any event, the problem to which the farm subsi-
dies were directed was neither foreign nor local. One might have argued that aid for a par-
ticular segment of the population, even if nationally distributed, did not serve the "general"
welfare. Compare Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1875) (striking down municipal
aid to private manufacturer for want of public purpose), discussed in Currie, First Hundred
Years at 381-82 (cited in note 13). But most expenditures benefit some persons more than
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not deny that it was: "We are not now required to ascertain the
scope of the phrase 'general welfare of the United States' or to de-
termine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within
it." Even if it did, "another principle embedded in our Constitu-
tion prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
The act invades the reserved rights of the states" because its pro-
visions "are . ..means to [the] unconstitutional end" of "regu-
lat[ing] and control[ling] agricultural production, a matter beyond
the powers delegated to the federal government. 1 37
With such respect as may be due, as the noncommittal phrase
goes, this is nonsense. Having assumed that promoting agriculture
was a legitimate end of federal spending, Roberts was in a poor
position to argue that it was an unconstitutional one. Having held
that the spending power was not limited by the enumeration of
other congressional powers, he was hopelessly inconsistent in doing
so on the ground that Congress had no independent authority to
regulate agriculture.13 8 The Court's reliance on Marshall's warning
against the pretextual use of federal powers and on such derivative
precedents as the Child Labor Tax Case was therefore misplaced,
for under Roberts's own test the law was not a pretext for the ac-
complishment of an illegitimate purpose.139
Roberts went on to insist that the law was regulatory in effect
because it was coercive: "The farmer, of course, may refuse to com-
ply, but the price of such refusal is the loss of benefits. The
amount offered is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on
him to agree to the proposed regulation."''4 Stone's response in
dissent was crushing: "The power of Congress to spend is insepara-
ble from persuasion to action over which Congress has no legisla-
others, and it would have been hard to deny that the plight of the farmers posed serious
problems for the nation as a whole.
137 297 U.S. at 68.
138 See Powell, Vagaries and Varieties at 82-83 (cited in note 52), adding that "Mr.
Justice Roberts drew from a major premise what he had expressly excluded from it."
13' See 297 U.S. at 68-70. For the same reason, the Court's invocation of cases applying
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see id. at 71-72, citing Frost Trucking Co. v.
Railroad Com., 271 U.S. 583 (1926), also was misplaced. Indeed, Roberts's broad reading of
the tax power in Butler arguably cast doubt on the Child Labor Tax Case itself: if the tax
power could be employed for any purpose serving the general welfare, then taxation for the
purpose of preventing child labor was for a legitimate purpose. Butler need not be read this
broadly, however, for Roberts preserved the requirement of a revenue purpose by defining
the taxing power as the power to tax "for the purpose of providing funds" with which to
promote the general welfare. 297 U.S. at 64. See Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1122 (cited in
note 2), discussing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); text accompanying notes
185-86, discussing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
14 297 U.S. at 70-71.
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tive control. Congress may not command that the science of agri-
culture be taught in state universities. But if it would aid the
teaching of that science by grants to state institutions, it is appro-
priate, if not necessary, that the grant be on the condition . . .
that it be used for the intended purpose.' ' 4 1 Roberts protested
that "[t]here is an obvious difference between a statute stating the
conditions upon which moneys shall be expended and one effective
only upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit to a
regulation which otherwise could not be enforced.' ' 42 The differ-
ence was indeed obvious, but so was its irrelevance: in either case
Congress has purchased compliance with provisions it could not
have imposed directly.143
All this floundering was motivated by the same concern that
had underlain efforts to limit the commerce power in cases from
E.C. Knight to Carter. If Congress could buy reductions in acreage,
said Roberts, it could buy anything else it liked. It could not be
that the framers of the Constitution, who "in erecting the federal
government, intended sedulously to limit and define its powers,
. . . nevertheless by a single clause gave power to the Congress to
tear down the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to
become a parliament of the whole people.' 1 44
The concern was justified, but it was a little late to assert it.
Roberts gave the game away when he accepted Hamilton's argu-
ment that Congress could spend for any purpose that served the
general welfare. As Stone pointed out, the power to spend is the
power to make offers that cannot be refused. Such authority is in-
compatible with the basic premise of limited federal power.
Roberts's objection to Madison's alternative interpretation of
the clause was not convincing. McCulloch v. Maryland teaches
both that redundancy is not foreign to the Constitution (the neces-
sary and proper clause and the tenth amendment having been
added out of an abundance of caution) and that the power to tax
141 Indeed, he argued, "[e]xpenditures would fail of their purpose and thus lose their
constitutional sanction if their terms of payment were not such that by their influence...
the permitted end would be attained." Id. at 83.
142 Id. at 73.
143 See id. at 83-84 (Stone, dissenting) ("It makes no difference that there is a promise
to do an act which the condition is calculated to induce. Condition and promise are alike
valid since both are in furtherance of the national purpose for which the money is appropri-
ated."). Roberts would have been better advised to focus upon content rather than form.
Conditions or promises relating to the use of the granted funds themselves arguably might
have been distinguished from those unrelated to the use of the money, since if the latter are
permitted, there is indeed no practical limit to federal power.
144 Id. at 78.
[54:504
The New Deal, 1931-1940
for purposes elsewhere enumerated would not be redundant (since
it "cannot be implied as incidental to other powers").145 It would
indeed have been astounding for the framers to leave to the vagar-
ies of implication their most important departure from the Articles
of Confederation. 146
A glimpse at those Articles, in fact, affords an invaluable clue
as to the purpose of the general welfare clause, for the words are
taken directly from that document: "All charges of war, and all
other expences that shall be incurred for the common defence or
general welfare, and allowed by the united states in congress as-
sembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall
be supplied by the several states in proportion to the value of all
land within each state."'"47 This provision granted no authority to
spend at all; it merely prescribed how Congress was to defray such
expenses as might be incurred pursuant to authority elsewhere
given.
The only significant change made in this provision in 1789 was
the addition of a power to tax. Far from being redundant, the gen-
eral welfare clause provided that legitimate expenses should be
paid out of federal taxes instead of state contributions. There is no
evidence that it was meant to expand the purposes for which ex-
penditures might be made.
Justice Roberts therefore may well have reached the right re-
sult in striking down the Agricultural Adjustment Act,"48 but by
145 17 U.S. 316, 406, 409, 411, 420-21 (1819), discussed in Currie, First Hundred Years
at 160-65 (cited in note 13).
146 See Federalist No. 30 at 189 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the inadequacy of
the revenue provisions of the Articles reduced the Confederation to a condition "which af-
fords ample cause, both of mortification to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies").
"7 Articles of Confederation art. VIII (1781).
149 In Loss, ed., Corwin on the Constitution at 253-69 (cited in note 133), Professor
Corwin collected impressive instances of broad construction of the general welfare clause by
figures as diverse as Washington and Calhoun, and pointed to numerous federal statutes
spending for such purposes as lighthouses, internal improvements, and the promotion of
agriculture or education. As Corwin conceded, id. at 267, internal improvements had been
upheld as necessary and proper to the commerce, postal, and war powers. See Currie, First
Hundred Years at 275 n.298, 429-30 (cited in note 13). However, these powers were not the
basis of the original argument for their validity, and they fail to explain the grants for agri-
culture or education. Since this broad interpretation had been controversial, it does not
disprove the conclusion as to original intent suggested by the Articles of Confederation; but
by 1936 it may have been a little late to deny it respect as what Justice Frankfurter was
later to term a "gloss" on the Constitution. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (concurring opinion): "Deeply embedded traditional ways of con-
ducting government cannot supplant the Constitution. . . , but they give meaning to the
words of a text or supply them." See also J. A. C. Grant, Commerce, Production and the
Fiscal Powers of Congress: II, 45 Yale L. J. 991, 1000 (1936) (Hamiltonian view too embed-
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conceding too much he made it seem quite untenable; and that
boded poorly for the future of the federal system. 149
D. Other Limitations
It was not only article I that the Court began to read narrowly
in 1935. Other decisions of the same time suggested a return to
more restrictive understanding of other limits on both federal and
state authority.
1. Minimum wages. The most notable of these was
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, a five-to-four due process
decision striking down yet another minimum wage law on the au-
thority of Adkins v. Children's Hospital.150 After Nebbia, the
Court might have been expected to come out the other way. By
abandoning the requirement that the business be "affected with a
public interest," that decision had seemed to mean that what the
Court had once dismissed as impermissible "leveling"-the effort
to ameliorate the effects of unequal bargaining power-had be-
come a legitimate legislative goal, even if the justices were not yet
prepared to recognize the palpable relation between low wages and
both crime and ill health.15
1
Most significantly, as Hughes pointed out in dissent, the law
ded by the "forces of history" to undo).
1,0 In striking contrast to the decisions of this period narrowly interpreting domestic
federal powers was Justice Sutherland's sweeping conclusion in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936), over a dissent by Justice McReynolds, that the
United States possessed plenary authority over foreign affairs without regard to the limited
enumeration in article I: "The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no
powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as
are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs." The conclusion that the framers intended to convey
plenary authority over foreign affairs is hard to avoid in light of history; but Sutherland's
peculiar argument that "the states severally never possessed international powers," id. at
316, has been severely criticized. See Julius Goebel, Jr., Constitutional History and Consti-
tutional Law, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 555, 572 (1938); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 Yale L. J. 1 (1973); David
M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory,
55 Yale L. J. 467 (1946); C. Perry Patterson, In re the United States v. The Curtiss-Wright
Corporation, 22 Tex. L. Rev. 286 (1944); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
23-25 (1972). Since the case involved a regulation of foreign commerce clearly within article
I, section 8, Sutherland's remarks went far beyond the necessities of the case.
150 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
15 See the discussion of Nebbia in notes 28-33 and accompanying text; of Adkins in
Currie, 1986 Duke L. J. at 76-77 (cited in note 1); and of "leveling" in Currie, 52 U. Chi. L.
Rev. at 378-82 (cited in note 13), and Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1129-31 (cited in note 2).
The modern economic literature arguing that minimum wage laws reduce employment is
summarized in Posner, Economic Analysis at 28 (cited in note 27).
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in Morehead had been drafted to meet the objection most stressed
in Adkins. "The feature of this statute which, perhaps more than
any other, puts upon it the stamp of invalidity," Justice Suther-
land had complained in that case, "is that it exacts from the em-
ployer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and upon a basis having
no causal connection with his business .... The moral require-
ment implicit in every contract of employment, viz, that the
amount to be paid and the service to be rendered shall bear to
each other some relation of just equivalence, is completely
ignored."'12
By contrast, the New York law in Morehead forbade only
those wages that were "both less than the fair and reasonable value
of the services rendered and less than sufficient to meet the mini-
mum cost of living necessary for health."' 153 The Court had struck
down the law in Adkins because it required employers to solve a
problem they had not caused; the law they struck down in
Morehead cured that defect by imposing on the employer only the
reasonable cost of his business.
Brushing aside the crucial language Hughes quoted from Ad-
kins, Justice Butler for the majority insisted that that decision had
invalidated all minimum wage laws. 5 4 More surprisingly still, he
refused even to consider whether Adkins was still law, on the
ground that the question had not been raised in the petition for
review. Justice Stone in a second dissent pointed tellingly to the
petition's statement that "'the circumstances prevailing under
which the New York law was enacted call for a reconsideration of
the Adkins case in the light of the New York act.'" More sweep-
ingly, he attacked the Court's premise: "I know of no rule or prac-
tice by which the arguments advanced in support of an application
for certiorari restrict our choice between conflicting precedents in
deciding a question of constitutional law which the petition, if
granted, requires us to answer. '1 55
The majority's ringing restatement of Adkins did little to en-
courage the hope that that decision would be overruled even if the
question were more explicitly presented; and as in Alton Railroad
it was Justice Roberts who cast the decisive vote against
... Adkins, 261 U.S. at 558, quoted in Morehead, 298 U.S. at 623-24 (Hughes, dissent-
ing, joined by Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone).
151 298 U.S. at 605, 621.
' Id. at 610-14. Butler did not explain whether the fault lay in the illegitimacy of the
legislature's goals or in the inappropriateness of the means for attaining them.
155 Id. at 636.
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regulation. 156
2. Other cases. Morehead did not stand alone as evidence of
the vitality of extraneous limitations on state and federal legisla-
tion. Alton Railroad invoked the due process clause of the fifth
amendment as a second ground for striking down various provi-
sions of the railroad retirement law.157 Several decisions cited ei-
ther due process or full faith and credit in imposing territorialist
limitations on state taxation and choice of law.158 Louisville Bank
v. Radford unanimously invalidated a federal measure for the relief
of insolvent farmers as an uncompensated taking of property from
'" The minimum wage law in Morehead applied only to women and children, and
there was a foretaste of modern equal protection analysis in Justice Butler's observation
that "prescribing of minimum wages for women alone would unreasonably restrain them in
competition with men and tend arbitrarily to deprive them of employment and a fair chance
to find work." Id. at 617. The dissenters protested, in terms then viewed as progressive, that
states were entitled to conclude that women needed special protection. See id. at 629-30
(Hughes, dissenting).
157 295 U.S. at 348-62 (objecting principally to provisions found to operate retroactively
or to treat all railroads "as a single employer" and holding them inseparable). The same
four justices who dissented from the commerce clause holding largely dissented from these
conclusions as well, although they agreed with the majority that for Congress to require the
extension of pensions to those no longer employed by the railroads was arbitrary and be-
yond its power. Id. at 384-92, 389 (Hughes, dissenting).
1" See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930) (McReynolds, over dissents by
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone) (only owner's domicile may tax bank accounts, bonds, and
notes); Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1935) (McReynolds, over dissents by Stone, Bran-
deis, and Cardozo) (state may not tax intangible interest in foreign land); Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (Brandeis) (state may not invalidate clause in foreign contract
limiting time for suit); Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (Brandeis) (state
of injury must respect exclusivity provision in workers' compensation law of employment
state); Hartford Co. v. Delta Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934) (Roberts) (same as Dick, despite more
substantial contacts with forum state); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) (Brandeis)
(shareholder's state must enforce shareholder liability law of state of incorporation); John
Hancock Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936) (Brandeis) (law of place of contracting deter-
mines effect of fraud in insurance application). See also Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258
(1933) (Brandeis) (allowing New York to make New Jersey automobile owner liable for neg-
ligence of bailee in New York) ("Liability for a tort depends upon the law of the place of the
injury."). For criticism of this line of cases, see Charles L. B. Lowndes, Spurious Concep-
tions of the Constitutional Law of Taxation, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 628 (1934); Joseph H. Beale,
Two Cases on Jurisdiction, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 620 (1935).
The Court also appropriately furthered the purposes of the full faith and credit clause
by requiring one state to respect another's judgments for child support, Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (Brandeis, over an emotional dissent by Stone), and for taxes,
Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (Stone) (effectively previewed in Rob-
ert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1932)). For earlier decisions in these fields, see Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 375-78
(cited in note 13); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court- Full Faith and
the Bill of Rights, 1889-1910, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 880-97 (1985); Currie, 1985 Duke L. J.
at 1138-39 n.140 (cited in note 2).
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creditors. 159 Two unanimous decisions striking down state legisla-
tion even showed that, despite Blaisdell, there was still some life in
the contract clause.160 Perry v. United States invented a spanking
new limitation in concluding that the grant of power to borrow im-
plicitly forbade the United States to welsh on its obligations:
money can be borrowed only if it will be paid back. 1'
The invalidation of a graduated state sales tax in Stewart Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewis showed that equal protection too was alive and
well in economic cases despite the chain store cases. 6 2 Even the
forgotten privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was disinterred to strike down a preference for local invest-
ment in Colgate v. Harvey.' Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig demon-
159 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (Brandeis) (invalidating Frazier-Lemke Act). See also Nashville,
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935) (Brandeis, over Stone and Cardozo, dissent-
ing), which held that a railroad could not be required to pay for a grade separation promot-
ing only convenience and not safety. These holdings followed easily from Brandeis's sensible
distinction between forbidding a person to injure others and requiring him to help them.
See Currie, 1986 Duke L. J. at 92-99 (cited in note 1), discussing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
160 W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (Hughes) (exemption of insur-
ance benefits from garnishment to satisfy preexisting debts); Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,
295 U.S. 56 (1935) (Cardozo) (severe impairment of security for preexisting debts).
161 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (Hughes, with Stone declining to reach the issue). The case
involved a congressional effort to pay off in depreciated currency obligations expressly
stated in terms of gold. See also id. at 354 (invoking § 4 of the fourteenth amendment,
which provides that "[tihe validity of the public debt of the United States. . . shall not be
questioned"); Phanor J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 Cor-
nell L. Q. 1 (1933). The taking clause would have furnished a more traditional basis for the
decision; in reducing the value of the obligations, the government had enriched itself with-
out compensating its victim. In a companion case essentially governed by the Legal Tender
cases (discussed in Currie, First Hundred Years at 321-29 (cited in note 13) and in John
Dickinson, The Gold Decisions, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715 (1935)), the Court held due process
was not offended by a similar effort directed toward private contracts. Norman v. B. & 0.
RR. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (Hughes, over the expected four dissents). See also John P.
Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 647 (1935), and Charles S. Collier,
Gold Contracts and Currency Regulation, 23 Cornell L. Q. 520 (1938) (both tracing the gov-
ernment's efforts to article I, § 8's provision empowering Congress to "regulate the value" of
money). Moreover, even in Perry the Government ultimately got its way because of the
Chief Justice's bizarre conclusion (over the same four dissents) that the bondholders had
lost nothing by the enormous depreciation of their rights. See 294 U.S. at 354-58; Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Gold Clause in United States Bonds, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1077-81 (1935);
Powell, Vagaries and Varieties at 86 (cited in note 52) ("[Hlow it could be held that Con-
gress may not renege on a national promise to pay in gold of specified density, and then
apply to the bondholder the tort measure of damages instead of the contract one, well nigh
passes comprehension."). Roosevelt had gone so far as to prepare a speech justifying disobe-
dience of judicial orders for delivery in case of an adverse decision. See Pusey, 2 Charles
Evans Hughes at 736 (cited in note 2).
142 294 U.S. 550 (1935) (Roberts, over three dissents).
146 296 U.S. 404, 430 (1935) (Sutherland, over dissents of Stone, Brandeis, and Car-
dozo), building upon the unpedigreed right to travel recognized in Crandall v. Nevada, 73
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strated the strength of the negative effect of the commerce clause
by rubbing out a state law designed to place local and out-of-state
milk sellers on an equal footing.164 The Court seemed rather strict
in holding that both railroading and water distribution were "gov-
ernmental" functions immune from taxation by other govern-
ments.16 5 Finally, in forbidding Congress to allow local govern-
ments to discharge their debts in federal court, it perversely
employed the immunity doctrine to the detriment of its intended
beneficiaries.166
U.S. 35 (1868), to conclude that "[t]he right ... to make a lawful loan of money in any
state other than that in which the citizen resides is a privilege equally attributable to his
national citizenship". According to Justice Stone, the Court decided to rely on the privileges
or immunities clause only after it became clear that an equal protection challenge was un-
tenable. See Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 399-402 (cited in note 12). For contemporaneous
criticism, see Pendleton Howard, The Privileges and Immunites of Federal Citizenship and
Colgate v. Harvey, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 262 (1939); Fraenkel, 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 40 (cited in
note 127) (arguing that Colgate "illustrates the capacity of the Court to find in the Consti-
tution language appropriate to every need, at least when property rights are involved"). For
the earlier fate of this clause, see Currie, First Hundred Years at 342-51, 363-64 (cited in
note 13).
4 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (Cardozo). The law forbade sale in New York of milk bought
elsewhere at a price lower than that permitted within the state; it was condemned as an
effort to shield New York farmers from outside competition. Id. at 522. Cardozo's analogy of
a tariff against out-of-state products, id. at 521-22, seemed out of place, for a tariff is dis-
criminatory. Nevertheless, if both states adopted conflicting regulations on this subject, in-
terstate commerce could be stifled entirely. See Currie, First Hundred Years at 337-42 (cited
in note 13), discussing the Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232 (1873).
Other decisions of the mid-thirties reaffirmed congressional power both to remove the
commerce clause barrier to state legislation and to make interstate transportation of goods
contrary to state law a federal crime. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936) (Sutherland),
and Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) (Hughes)
(both involving prison-made goods). For earlier precedents, see Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
361-62 (cited in note 13); Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1144 n.167 (cited in note 2); Currie,
1986 Duke L. J. at 112-20 (cited in note 1). For contemporaneous commentary, see J. A. C.
Grant, State Power to Prohibit Interstate Commerce, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 34 (1937).
1 6 New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937) (Sutherland) (employee of
Panama Rail Road, operated as adjunct to Panama Canal, exempt from state income tax);
Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 352 (1937) (Sutherland, over dissents of Brandeis and
Roberts) (employee of city water bureau exempt from federal income tax). Contrast South
Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 458, 463 (1905) (allowing federal tax on state liquor
sales). At the same time, declaring it immaterial whether the activity regulated was govern-
mental or proprietary, the Court unanimously held that Congress could require automatic
couplers on a state-owned railroad. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-85 (1936)
(Stone). In the converse situation' the Court had sensibly recognized that state regulation
was as great a threat to federal autonomy as was state taxation. See Johnson v. Maryland,
254 U.S. 51 (1920) (state may not require license for post office driver).
16 Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improv. Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (McReynolds,
over four apt dissents). Contrast Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (state's elev-
enth amendment immunity from suit "a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure"),
discussed in Currie, First Hundred Years at 427 n.163 (cited in note 13); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (counly not "state" within eleventh amendment); United States
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By 1937 it was abundantly clear that the measures that many
people believed necessary for economic recovery would not survive
Supreme Court scrutiny. It was at this point that President
Roosevelt decided to destroy the Court.
III. A GREAT LIGHT
On February 5, 1937, the president announced his proposal to
enlarge the Court to fifteen members. Although he coated the pill
with unconvincing arguments about the inefficiency of elderly jus-
tices, he made no secret of his real purpose: to pack the Court with
judges more sympathetic to his legislative program. 1 7
Had he succeeded, the Court would never have been the same.
Recognition of the legitimacy of diluting the votes of obstructive
justices would have severely weakened the Court's ability to en-
force the Constitution against other branches, which ever since
Marbury v. Madison had been accepted as one of its principal
functions.'" 8
v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (suggesting intergovernmental immunity is no limit on
commerce power). See the sensible criticism in Harold Gill Reuschlein, Municipal Debt Re-
adjustment: Present Relief and Future Policy, 23 Cornell L. Q. 365, 373-82 (1938); Fraenkel,
85 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 38 (cited in note 131) (terming Ashton "as clear a case of judicial
legislation as has taken place in a long time").
167 The bill provided for appointing one new judge for each member of the Court who
had reached the age of seventy, had sat for ten years, and had neither resigned nor retired
within six months thereafter. S.1392, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). Six of the nine justices
met these criteria when the bill was introduced. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary,
Sen. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (June 7, 1937). Roosevelt explained his purpose
in an address on March 9: "the majority of the Court has been assuming the power to pass
on the wisdom of ... acts of the Congress.. . . [W]e must take action to save the Constitu-
tion from the Court." 81 Cong. Rec. Appen. pt. 9 at 469, 470. See generally Robert H. Jack-
son, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (1941); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of
Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 S.Ct. Rev. 347; Gunther, Constitutional
Law at 129-30 (cited in note 72). Others more appropriately suggested a constitutional con-
vention to increase federal power. See, for example, Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review
of Acts of Congress and the Need for Constitutional Reform, 45 Yale L. J. 816 (1936). See
also Joseph L. Levinson, Limiting Judicial Review By Act of Congress, 23 Cal. L. Rev. 591
(1935) (advocating statutory requirement of extraordinary majority to invalidate federal
statutes under congressional power to make "exceptions" or "regulations" respecting the
Court's appellate jurisdiction); D. 0. McGovney, Reorganization of the Supreme Court, 25
Cal. L. Rev. 389 (1937) (supporting the packing plan). For a serious proposal to deal by
constitutional amendment with the sometimes acute problem of justices who had lost their
mental capacity, see Charles Falrman, The Retirement of Federal Judges, 51 Harv. L. Rev.
397 (1938).
l6g See McCloskey, The American Supreme Court at 169 (cited in note 7), arguing that
passage of the packing plan "would set a precedent from which the institution of judicial
review might never recover.. . . [T]he ambiguous and delicately balanced American tradi-
tion of limited government was mortally endangered by this bill." Hughes himself is said to
have declared that were the bill to pass, "it would destroy the [C]ourt as an institution." See
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Happily, it never came to that, for the Court dramatically
changed its course. The packing plan died of supererogation. Un-
happily, the price of judicial independence was the death of our
federal system.
A. The End of Federalism
On March 29, 1937, less than two months after the president
had announced his packing plan and less than a year after
Morehead had reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of minimum
wage laws, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish reached the opposite
conclusion. 16 9 Once again the vote was five to four. The difference
was attributable to Justice Roberts, who silently joined the major-
ity in both cases.
The common perception that this was the crucial change of
heart that saved the Court seems erroneous. To begin with, the
critical vote in Parrish had been taken before the packing plan was
made public; unless there was a leak, the decision does not even
seem to have been a response to the proposal.1 70 Second, it was not
clear that Roberts had actually changed his mind. Parrish over-
ruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital, which had established the
general principle that minimum wage laws were unconstitutional;
Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes at 755 (cited in note 2). Even Stone, who had excoriated the
Court for its excesses in Butler, wrote privately that the president's "proposal [wa]s too
high a price to pay for the correction of some decisions of the Court which I, in common
with a great many others, think unfortunate." See Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 449 (cited
in note 12). See also the admirable answer to Roosevelt's proposal in Sen. Rep. No. 711 at
23 (cited in note 167) ("a measure which should be so emphatically rejected that its parallel
will never again be presented to the free representatives of the free people of America");
Alpheus Thomas Mason, Politics and the Supreme Court: President Roosevelt's Proposal,
85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 659, 676 (1937) (urging instead an amendment to allow Congress by two-
thirds vote to override Supreme Court decisions); Currie, First Hundred Years at 66-74,
304-07 (cited in note 13), discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869).
169 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (Hughes), finding the statute an admissible means for promot-
ing both "the health of women and their protection from unscrupulous and overreaching
employers" and noting-in evident response to the argument that employers should not be
made to bear the burden-that" '[i]t is safe to assume that women will not be employed at
even the lowest wages allowed unless they earn them.'" Id. at 397-98, quoting Holmes's
Adkins dissent. The argument of sex discrimination was rejected summarily: women's "rela-
tive need in the presence of the evil, no less than the existence of the evil itself, is a matter
for the legislative judgment." Id. at 400.
10 See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (1955) (quoting a
memorandum left by Roberts); Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes at 757 (cited in note 2),
adding that Hughes himself later insisted that "[t]he President's proposal had not the
slightest effect on our decision." On the secrecy surrounding the proposal, see
Leuchtenburg, 1966 S.Ct. Rev. at 396 (cited in note 167).
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Morehead had carefully said the question of overruling Adkins was
not before the Court. 7 1 Finally, due process had never been at the
center of the Court's disagreement with the New Deal; until the
Court receded from its restrictive interpretation of federal power,
the president's program remained in mortal peril.
The real breakthrough came on April 12, when in three com-
panion cases the Court by the same five to four vote upheld the
National Labor Relations Act provision protecting the right of em-
ployees not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to organize
for purposes of collective bargaining. The Court took the easiest
case first: Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, which involved a gi-
ant steelmaker that obtained its ores from other states and
shipped 75 percent of its products in interstate commerce. 17
The author was Hughes, and the rationale was that which he
had enunciated in Shreveport and Schechter: the commerce power
"may be exerted to protect interstate commerce 'no matter what
the source of the dangers which threaten it.' ,17' As the Court re-
cently had held in upholding similar provisions for railroad work-
ers, "the right of employees to self-organization. . .[was] often an
essential condition of industrial peace. 1 74 Though manufacturing
was not itself commerce, "the stoppage of. . . [Jones & Laugh-
lin's] operations by industrial strife would have a most serious ef-
fect upon interstate commerce"; congressional protection of the
right to organize was "necessary to protect interstate commerce
from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war. 17 5
Given the established test Hughes employed, this answer was
hard to avoid. As he pointed out, an organizing strike at Jones &
Laughlin could have had a "catastrophic" impact on interstate
commerce in steel. T' A similar argument had been rejected in
M See 300 U.S. at 389. See also Powell, Vagaries and Varieties at 81 n.89 (cited in note
52): "Mr. Justice Roberts's position in the two cases can be harmonized as the view of one
who was unable to distinguish the Adkins case but who would accept an opportunity to
overrule it." Indeed, Parrish seemed more in line with Roberts's views on related issues than
did Morehead. See notes 13-33 and accompanying text, discussing, among others, Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes at 771 (cited in note 2);
Frankfurter, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 314-15 (cited in note 170) (quoting the Roberts
memorandum).
172 301 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1937).
:73 Id. at 37.
174 Id. at 42. See Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (Hughes); Virgin-
ian Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (Stone).
:7 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41.
1 Id. at 41. See also id. at 42 ("[O]f what avail is it to protect the facility of transpor-
tation, if interstate commerce is throttled with respect to the commodities to be trans-
ported!"). McReynolds, who wrote the usual dissent, protested that a strike was not inevita-
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Carter, however, on the ground that this impact was "indirect. '17 7
One of the companion cases, moreover, cited Jones & Laughlin
without discussion to sustain application of the labor law to a
small clothing manufacturer with a minuscule share of the inter-
state market.17 8 "The business of the Company is so small," Mc-
Reynolds objected in that case, "that to close its factory would
have no direct or material effect upon the volume of interstate
commerce in clothing." 7 9 That made the case hard to distinguish
from Schechter, and thus the case seemed to leave very little be-
yond the reach of the commerce power.8 "
This time Roberts and Hughes did seem to have changed their
minds; but so had Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, all of whom had
concurred in Schechter.181 The dissenters had been deftly hoisted
by their own petard, for it was Sutherland in the Carter case who
had so fatefully insisted that the magnitude of the effect on com-
merce was immaterial.182
ble even in the absence of legislation. Id. at 99. This, however, had been equally true in the
railroad cases.
177 Carter, 298 U.S. at 308 (majority opinion), 317 (Hughes, in separate opinion).
178 Labor Board v. Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) (Hughes). In this case, the com-
pany's total sales in the first ten months of 1935 amounted to $1,750,000. Id. at 72. The
third case, Labor Board v. Fruehauf Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937) (Hughes), applied the same
reasoning to the country's largest trailer manufacturer.
179 Clothing Co., 301 U.S. at 94 (dissent).
18S See id. at 99 (McReynolds, dissenting) ("Almost anything-marriage, birth, death-
may in some fashion affect commerce.") Professor Powell's attempted distinction between
pre- and post-commerce activities (Powell, Vagaries and Varieties at 80 (cited in note 52),
arguing that Schechter involved "local practices after the interstate transportation was com-
pleted, with no future extrastate effect to follow") fails to distinguish the coal mining regu-
lations struck down in Carter, which many thought had sealed the doom of the statute
upheld in the Labor Board cases. See, e.g., Stern, 59 Harv. L. Rev. at 676 (cited in note 73);
Fraenkel, 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 36 (cited in note 127). See also Joseph H. Mueller, Businesses
Subject to the National Labor Relations Act, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 1286, 1297 (1937), which
maintains that both Schechter and Carter were distinguishable from Jones & Laughlin be-
cause the effect of a work stoppage on commerce was more immediate than the "'intricate
economic effects of. . . labor costs upon the prices and movement of products in interstate
commerce'" (quoting from the government's brief in Jones & Laughlin). But this argument
had been made and rejected in Carter.
8I The usually tolerant Brandeis reputedly told Thomas Corcoran on the day
Schechter was decided: "This is the end of this business of centralization, and I want you to
go back and tell the President that we're not going to let this government centralize every-
thing." See Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval at 280 (cited in note 130).
18I The Court expressly confirmed that in Labor Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606
(1939) (Stone), involving yet another small clothing manufacturer: "It]he power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce . . . extends to all such commerce be it great or small."
With Van Devanter and Sutherland gone, only McReynolds and Butler remained to protest
that, as construed by the Court, the commerce power "brings within the ambit of federal
control most if not all activities of the Nation" and that "[i]f the possibility of this had been
declared the Constitution could not have been adopted." Id. at 610.
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Other decisions confirmed that the game was over. Helvering
v. Davis demonstrated the breadth of Butler's concession that
Congress could spend for any nationwide purpose by upholding the
old-age benefits provided through Social Security."' Steward Ma-
chine Co. v. Davis suggested that Butler and Carter had lost much
of their restrictive force by sustaining a federal tax plainly
designed to induce states to provide unemployment insurance.""
United States v. Darby5 5  explicitly overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart in holding that Congress could exclude from interstate
commerce goods made by employees paid less than a specified
wage and also drove yet another nail into Schechter's coffin by up-
holding federal minimum wages for employees engaged in produc-
tion. Not only did the latter provision, in Stone's view, protect
against the adverse effects of low wages on interstate commerce; it
was also sustainable on the more sweeping ground that it helped to
effectuate the exclusion from interstate trade. 1 8
It was shortly after Hughes's retirement that Wickard v. Fil-
burn permitted Congress to limit the wheat a farmer grew for his
own consumption on the ground that what he could not grow he
might buy from another state. 87 But that was only to write the
183 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (Cardozo, over dissents by McReynolds and Butler).
'" Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (Cardozo, over four dissents).
The law gave a 90 percent credit for contributions made to an unemployment fund under
state law. Id. at 574. As the Court noted, there was no contract in Steward, id. at 592; but
the arrangement was no less coercive as a result. Even Sutherland, however, did not argue
that states were coerced into establishing the unemployment fund. See id. at 610. See also
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937) (Stone), unanimously upholding a $200
annual tax on dealers in such firearms as machine guns and sawed-off shotguns: "[Courts]
will not undertake, by collateral inquiry as to the measure of the regulatory effect of a tax,
to ascribe to Congress an attempt, under the guise of taxation, to exercise another power
denied by the Federal Constitution." This case closely resembles Constantine, 296 U.S. 287
(1935), in all save the result; Professor Powell in Vagaries and Varieties at 87 (cited in note
52) termed it "[h]ardly candid."
1 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (Stone).
186 "Congress, having.., adopted the policy of excluding from interstate commerce all
goods . . . which do not conform to the specified labor standards . . . may choose the
means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve
control of intrastate activities." 312 U.S. at 121. Gunther suggests that if this "superboot-
strap" argument were taken at face value, congressional "regulation of local activities...
[could] now be justified without any showing of the impact of the local activity on com-
merce-simply by having the regulatory scheme include a ban on interstate shipments, and
then justifying the regulation as a means to effectuate that 'commerce-prohibiting' sanc-
tion." Gunther, Constitutional Law at 143-44 (cited in note 72). The tenth amendment,
Stone correctly emphasized, "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered." Darby, 312 U.S. at 124. The decision was unanimous, having been rendered
two days after the retirement of Justice McReynolds, the last of the old guard.
.11 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Jackson). The Court rejected the distinction between direct
and indirect effects, holding it irrelevant that "appellee's own . . . demand for wheat may
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epitaph; constitutional federalism had died in 1937.
B. Other Limitations
Federalism was not the only victim of the judicial New Deal.
Other longstanding constitutional limitations also underwent mo-
mentous changes.""8
The decline of economic due process heralded by Parrish con-
tinued with the overruling of decisions striking down bans on yel-
low dog contracts and regulation of employment agency fees. l" e A
state was allowed to legalize peaceful picketing despite the due
process and equal protection implications of Truax v. Corrigan.190
In sustaining a ban on interstate shipment of "filled" milk, the fa-
mous Carolene Products opinion enunciated a "rational basis" test
that raised doubts whether any economic regulation would be held
to offend due process on substantive grounds. 9' Olsen v. Nebraska
be trivial by itself. . . where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial." Id. at 127-28. There was no one left to dissent.
When subsidies for the same purpose were struck down in Butler, no one had even argued
that Congress could directly impose production quotas under the commerce power. See Mc-
Closkey, The American Supreme Court at 185 (cited in note 7): "It was now evident that
Congress could reach just about any commercial subject it might want to reach and could do
to that subject just about anything it was likely to want to do." Professor Powell in Vagaries
and Varieties at 83-84 (cited in note 52) called Wickard "an able latitudinarian opinion" by
which "formalism has been succeeded by plain common sense" and concluded that
"[h]appily ... the Framers were wise enough ... to leave room for the judgments of their
successors" when drafting the commerce clause. See also the approving comments of Stern,
59 Harv. L. Rev. at 908-09 (cited in note 73).
188 See Osmond K. Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, 1937 Term,
87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 50, 50 (1938): "The 1937 Term is distinguished ... by the large number
of cases in which the Court reversed earlier positions."
189 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941) (Frankfurter), con-
firming the demise of Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and of Coppage v. Kan-
sas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 244 (1941) (Douglas), overruling
Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928). Compare Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440
(1937) (Brandeis) (unanimously upholding a revised federal law for the relief of insolvent
farmers), with Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
190 Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 479-80 (1937) (Brandeis, over four dis-
sents), distinguishing Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), on the ground that the picket-
ing in that case had not been peaceful. Indeed, the Court would soon hold in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (Murphy), that peaceful picketing was protected by freedom of
expression from state abridgement.
"I United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (Stone, speaking
at this point for four justices) ("[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators."). A
fifth vote for the result was cast by Justice Black, who had already advanced the startling
conclusion that corporations were not "persons" within the fourteenth amendment at all.
Connecticut General Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938) (dissenting opinion). See Mc-
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fueled those doubts by declaring that "the only constitutional
prohibitions or restraints which respondents have suggested for the
invalidation of this legislation are those notions of public policy
embedded in earlier decisions of this Court but which, as Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes long admonished, should not be read into the
Constitution.' 1 9
2
Other equal protection landmarks fell, and the recently ex-
humed privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was reburied when the Court sustained an agricultural ex-
emption from antitrust regulation and upheld a state statute that
discriminated against out-of-state deposits. 193 Further inroads were
made on the contract clause by allowing states retroactively to
limit both deficiency judgments and savings withdrawals.' What
Closkey, The American Supreme Court at 186 (cited in note 7): "It is hard to conceive a law
so patently unreasonable that it would fail under [the Carotene Products] test, and it is
therefore not surprising that the Court since 1937 has never encountered one."
The statute defined "filled milk" as skimmed milk "compounded with. . . any fat or oil
other than milk fat"-in this case, with coconut oil. 304 U.S. 144, 145 n.1 (1938). A similar
state law had been upheld in less tolerant days in Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919)
(Holmes, over three dissents on statutory grounds). See also Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127
U.S. 678 (1888) (upholding ban on sale of oleomargarine), discussed in Currie, First Hun-
dred Years at 377-78 (cited in note 13). The most serious argument in favor of the law
upheld in Carolene was that because crucial vitamins were removed with the butter fat,
children drinking only filled milk might suffer undernourishment and consequent disease.
See 304 U.S. at 149 n.2. But the Court subsequently sustained application of the law even
after the manufacturer remedied this deficiency by adding vitamins, because it was "dis-
putable" whether labeling requirements would counter the risk of confusion. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 18, 22-23, 29 (1944) (Reed, for a unanimous Court).
11- 313 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941) (Douglas) (upholding state statute limiting fees charged
by private employment agencies). See Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 S.Ct. Rev. 34, 36-40.
M Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (Frankfurter, over one of McReynolds's last
dissents), overruling Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902); Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1940) (Reed, over dissents by McReynolds and Roberts) ("We
think it quite clear that the right to carry out an incident to a trade, business or calling such
as the deposit of money in banks is not a privilege of national citizenship."), overruling
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935)).
1" Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539, 542 (1939) (Hughes) (stressing that the statute
abrogated the right to seek a deficiency judgment only if the value of the land sold at fore-
closure had equaled the outstanding debt: "The contract contemplated that the mortgagee
should make himself whole, if necessary, out of the security but not that he should be en-
riched at the expense of the debtor."); Veix v. Sixth Ward Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) (Reed).
Earlier cases had held that laws suspending contract rights had to be limited to the emer-
gency that necessitated them. See, e.g., W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 432
(1934). Veix held it irrelevant that the limit on savings withdrawals was "permanent." See
310 U.S. at 39-40. See also Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: I,
57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 548-51 (1944) (explaining that the law upheld in Honeyman was
"designed to prevent a party from getting more by way of remedy than he would get by
performance").
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looked like a delegation of legislative power to private parties was
upheld without so much as a reference to Carter.19 5 Under the deft
leadership of Justice Stone, moreover, the Court made drastic revi-
sions in three other areas involving the operation of the federal
system.196
In the field of intergovernmental immunity, the Court re-
treated from its recent conclusion that local governments could not
be permitted to invoke the protection of bankruptcy.9 7 It departed
from other precedents as well in allowing the taxation of govern-
ment contractors and governmental salaries. 98 At least where the
burden on government was only indirect, the Court of the late
1930s seemed disinclined to treat the power to tax as the power to
destroy unless it was discriminatorily applied. 9"
195 United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 (1939) (Reed) (upholding
provision for milk marketing orders to be effective upon approval by two thirds of produc-
ers, on the unconvincing ground that "Congress had the power to put this Order into effect
without the approval of anyone"). See Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51
Harv. L. Rev. 201 (1937), for sobering examples of the prevalence of private "lawmaking,"
from collective bargaining agreements to professional standards to rules of stock exchanges
and political parties. The delegation of authority to the secretary of agriculture to determine
the terms of such an order, which the Court also upheld, was fully consistent with the crite-
ria laid down in Schechter, for the statute required him, in the Court's words, essentially to
establish "the prices that will give the commodity a purchasing power equivalent to that of
the base period, considering the price and supply of feed and other pertinent economic con-
ditions affecting the milk market in the area." 307 U.S. at 577.
19 See Noel T. Dowling, Elliott E. Cheatham, and Robert L. Hale, Mr. Justice Stone
and the Constitution, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 351 (1936).
'9 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (Hughes, over two dissents), overruling
Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improv. Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
198 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 149-61 (1937) (Hughes, over dissents
by Roberts, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler after Van Devanter had retired), disap-
proving Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405
(1938) (Stone, over two dissents), limiting The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113
(1871); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (Stone, over two dissents),
overruling both Day and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937); Helvering
v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) (Hughes), overruling Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932), and Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922), in
broadening the ability of Congress to tax state oil lessees. See also O'Malley v. Woodrough,
307 U.S. 277, 282 (1939) (Frankfurter, over Butler's dissent), permitting Congress to tax the
salaries of federal judges appointed after the tax law was passed and casting doubt on Evans
v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920), which had forbidden taxation of previously appointed judges
whose compensation was expressly protected against diminution by article III. See generally
Charles L. B. Lowndes, Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1937 Term, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2-
15 (1938); Powell, Vagaries and Varieties at 122 (cited in note 52), criticizing Dravo on the
ground that "[f]rom an economic standpoint it makes no difference whether the tax is im-
posed on the seller or on the buyer, on the builder or on his patron."
199 "1 have always felt," wrote Stone privately in 1937, "that everything needful would
have been accomplished had Marshall merely declared that neither government can adopt a
tax which discriminates against the other." Letter to Irving Brant, May 1, 1937, quoted in
Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone at 503 (cited in note 12). See also Currie, First Hundred Years
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A similar philosophy underlay Justice Stone's equally creative
conclusion that the commerce clause precluded essentially only
those state laws discriminating against interstate commerce or sub-
jecting it to multiple burdens.2 00 Like the federal and state govern-
ments in the field of immunity, interstate commerce was not in his
view entitled to special privileges; it was enough that it not be sub-
jected to special burdens.0 1
No less revolutionary was Justice Stone's reformulation of the
geographical limitations that the Court had found both due pro-
cess and full faith and credit to impose on state power to tax or
at 165-68 (cited in note 13), discussing McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316.
200 See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938) (Stone) (upholding state law limiting width and weight of trucks as safety measure
despite serious effect on commerce); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250
(1938) (Stone) (upholding tax measured by gross receipts no other state could tax); McGold-
rick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 69 (1940) (Stone) (upholding sales tax
on goods delivered from other states over Hughes's dissent invoking Stone's own multiple
burden test: "[i]f New York can tax the delivery, Pennsylvania can tax the shipment and
New Jersey the transshipment"); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941) (Stone) (over-
ruling DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927), in upholding licensing of agent selling
interstate transportation).
See also Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (Cardozo) (upholding com-
pensatory use tax on goods bought outside the state despite analogy of Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935)); Milk Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 346 (1939) (Roberts)
(upholding power to set minimum prices for milk sold for transportation in interstate com-
merce after Baldwin had removed risk of contradictory law in receiving state). See generally
Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev. 1, 19-20 (1940)
(urging a frank balancing of state and federal interests under the rubric of implicit congres-
sional will); Powell, Vagaries and Varieties at chs. 5, 6 (cited in note 52), and especially id.
at 167-69 (suggesting by analogy to the original package cases, discussed in Currie, 52 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 358-60 (cited in note 13), that Baldwin and Henneford might be reconcilable
on the ground that "prohibition is much more of an intrusion on a free national economy
than is an equalizing tax"); Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and
the Position of the Judiciary, 67 Yale L. J. 219 (1957) (arguing that Stone's emphasis on
equality was insufficient to prevent protectionism or exploitation of geographical advan-
tage). Endorsements of Stone's view of multiple taxation include Thomas Reed Powell, New
Light on Gross Receipts Taxes, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1940); William B. Lockhart, State Tax
Barriers to Interstate Trade, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1253 (1940); Stanley Morrison, State Taxa-
tion of Interstate Commerce, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 727 (1942).
201 See Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 184-85 n.2, invoking the virtual representation argument
that Marshall had made in distinguishing state and federal taxes in McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316.
Stone wrote: "Underlying the stated rule [against discrimination against interstate com-
merce] has been the thought ... that when the regulation is of such a character that its
burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be
subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it
affects adversely some interests within the state." The same philosophy seems in part to
underlie other provisions assuring that politically weak classes are treated as well as the
dominant majority. See, for example, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 (citizens of other states enti-
tled to privileges and immunities of local citizens); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (equal protection of
the laws). See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 77-88 (1980).
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regulate. What mattered in the tax field was no longer the often
fictitious location of intangible property but rather whether the
taxpayer could fairly be said to receive protection in return for his
money. 02 Similarly, in choice of law cases Justice Story's territori-
alist analysis yielded to the requirement that the application of the
law in question serve a legitimate state interest.20 3 While this de-
velopment left unfulfilled the hope that the full faith and credit
clause might provide a means of resolving conflicts that interested
states could not work out on their own,204 some have defended it
on the ground that the problem is unfit for judicial resolution. 0 5 In
any event, the new analysis of state interests seemed more conso-
nant with the constitutional purpose of keeping one state from
meddling in another's affairs than did the procrustean rules it
supplanted.20 6
202 See New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937) (Stone, over dissents by
Butler and McReynolds) (state may tax income from out-of-state property); First Bank
Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1937) (Stone) (state of corporation's com-
mercial domicile may tax its shares in foreign corporations); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S.
357 (1939) (Stone, over four dissents) (both testator's and trustee's domiciles may tax pas-
sage of trust property by will).
203 Contrast, e.g., Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940) (Frankfurter, over dissents by
Roberts, Hughes, and McReynolds) (upholding requirement that local risks be insured
through a local agent, without regard to place contract was made), with Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (invalidating requirement that insurer qualify to do business in
state before taking action there with respect to insuring local risks). Contrast Pacific Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (Stone) (state of injury may apply
own workmen's compensation law though employment contract centered elsewhere), with
Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (Brandeis) (holding law of the place of
employment governed). The way to Pacific Ins. Co. had been cleared in Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm., 294 U.S. 532 (1935), where Stone had employed his
novel interest analysis to reaffirm the Clapper conclusion that the state of employment
might apply its law as well. Consider also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941) (Hughes)
(upholding state's right to regulate its citizen's gathering of sponges outside territorial lim-
its). The one decision out of line with other developments in this area was Sovereign Camp
of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 75 (1938) (Roberts) (alternative hold-
ing), where in reliance on precedent the Court unanimously held that a policyholder's state
could not deny that the terms of an insurance contract were ultra vires, because "the rights
of membership [in a fraternal benefit society] are governed by the law of the State of
incorporation."
204 See, for example, Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause
of the Constitution, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1945).
205 See Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws ch. 5 (1963).
208 Both the territorialist approach and Justice Stone's approach to full faith and credit
depended on the disputable conclusion that the reference to "public Acts" in that clause
was meant to require respect for general laws of other states rather than, as explained in the
Convention, for quasi-judicial legislation such as individual acts of bankruptcy. See the dis-
cussion in Currie, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 885-86 n.117 (cited in note 158). As far as due
process was concerned, Stone's interest analysis was a natural corollary of the general re-
quirement that laws be reasonably tailored to accomplish legitimate legislative goals.
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Related to the interstate choice of law cases was the stunning
decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,' 7 overruling nearly 100 years of
precedent in holding that federal courts must follow state judge-
made law as well as state statutes except where the Constitution or
federal statutes otherwise required.20 8 That was indeed what the
governing statute seemed to modern eyes to say, and recent schol-
arship had suggested it reflected the original intention as well. 09
But Justice Brandeis was willing to depart from stare decisis only
because he was convinced that the earlier practice was unconstitu-
tional: "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of com-
mon law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature
or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts."210
It may seem odd that the Court cut back on federal judicial
authority at the same time it so greatly expanded the powers of
Congress. Perhaps it was still true, as Brandeis argued, that Con-
gress itself could not regulate everything. After the permissive
commerce clause decisions of the preceding year, however, there
was certainly a strong argument that Congress could have regu-
lated the liability of interstate railroads to trespassers, and that
was what Erie involved.2 11
Thus on the facts of the case the more serious objection
seemed to be one less of federalism than of separation of powers:
whether or not Congress could make rules to govern the particular
o' 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Brandeis, over dissents by Butler and McReynolds).
208 The contrary conclusion, with the exception of such "local" matters as those re-
specting land, had been reached in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
109 See Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 725
"[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply"); Charles
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49
(1924). Later observers have been less confident of this conclusion. See William Winslow
Crosskey, 1 & 2 Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 626-28,
866-71 (1953); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 389-91 (1964).
210 304 U.S. at 78. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
693, 703 (1974) (practice under Swift v. Tyson "was unconstitutional because nothing in the
Constitution provided the central government with a general lawmaking authority of the
sort the Court had been exercising").
"I See Ely, 87 Harv. L. Rev. at 703 n.62 (cited in note 210); Second Employers' Liabil-
ity Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 52 (1912) (upholding federal law rendering interstate railroad liable for
injuries to employees), discussed in Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at 1119 (cited in note 2). For
lingering doubts on this issue, see Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two,
133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231, 1312 & n.401 (1985).
1987]
The University of Chicago Law Review
case, it had not done so; and the federal courts had only those
powers given them by the Constitution or statute.212
The grant of admiralty jurisdiction had long been understood
to imply authority to fashion federal common law.213 Brandeis did
not explain why the parallel grant of diversity jurisdiction, which
was the basis of the suit in Erie, did not imply such authority as
well.214 The answer lies in the differing purposes the Court has
found to underlie the two jurisdictional provisions: while one rea-
son for the admiralty grant was apparently to permit the develop-
ment of a uniform maritime law, the purpose of diversity jurisdic-
tion was only to assure out-of-state litigants an impartial forum. 1 5
Thus the best explanation of the constitutional holding in Erie
212 Viewed in this light, Erie and the increased tolerance for federal legislation were
wholly consistent manifestations of a general tendency toward restraint in the exercise of
federal judicial authority.
213 See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 574-75 (1875), discussed in Currie, First Hundred
Years at 404 n.4 (cited in note 13); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917)
("[I]n the absence of some controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the
federal courts constitutes part of our national law."), discussed in Currie, 1985 Duke L. J. at
1139-45 (cited in note 2).
214 See Charles T. McCormick and Elvin Hale Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law
in the Federal Courts, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 126, 135, 141 (1938). This contrast was heightened by
Brandeis's unexplained conclusion, the very day Erie was decided, that "whether the water
of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal
common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be con-
clusive." Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
225 See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv.
L. Rev. 881, 915-18 (1986). See also Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160
(1920) ("To preserve adequate harmony and appropriate uniform rules relating to maritime
matters and bring them within control of the Federal Government was the fundamental
purpose [of the admiralty clause]."); David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty. "The
Devil's Own Mess," 1960 S.Ct. Rev. 158, 158-64; Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9
U.S. 61, 87 (1809) (attributing diversity jurisdiction to "apprehensions" that state courts
might not "administer justice . . . impartially" in cases involving outsiders). Justice Bran-
deis reaffirmed this understanding of diversity jurisdiction elsewhere in the Erie opinion.
304 U.S. at 74.
The citation in Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 110, to Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98
(1907), helps to explain the contrast between Hinderlider and Erie. Kansas was a contro-
versy between states. Since to apply the law of either state in such a case would make one
party the judge in its own cause, the jurisdictional grant of jurisdiction over controversies
between states has also been held to confer federal common law authority. See Texas v. New
Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965); Friendly, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 383, 394-98 (cited in note
209). Hinderlider was not itself an interstate suit, but the federal common law developed in
such suits is supreme and thus applicable in other cases as well. Compare Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411 (1953) (holding federal maritime law governed in diversity
case).
For the argument that no grant of judicial power in article III was meant to embrace
lawmaking authority, see Edward S. Stimson, Swift v. Tyson-What Remains?, 24 Cornell
L. Q. 54, 60-64 (1938) (invoking an earlier draft conveying "jurisdiction" rather than "judi-
cial power").
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is that, like a state court that has no significant contacts with the
matter in controversy, a federal court sitting solely in diversity is a
disinterested forum with respect to the merits; and as Justice
Stone made clear in the interstate choice of law cases, only an in-
terested forum can apply its own law.216
CONCLUSION
The Constitution was very different at the end of Hughes's
tenure than at the beginning. The retreat of substantive due pro-
cess in economic cases was a blessing; the doctrine had been illegit-
imate from the start. In rewriting the contract clause and eradicat-
ing federalistic limitations on national authority, however, the
Court seemed to embrace the dangerous principle that constitu-
tional provisions that did not suit contemporary needs need not be
respected.
All nine justices voted to enforce the limitation on congres-
sional power in Schechter; two years later five of them voted to
ignore it. Why? Had the Court-packing proposal frightened them
into making a tactical concession to avoid the greater evil?217 Had
circumstances or public opinion persuaded them that the need for
a stronger central government justified taking liberties with the
Constitution? 218 Had repeated encounters with refractory factual
situations convinced them that there was no tenable place to draw
the line? Answers to questions like these are not to be found in
judicial opinions.
... That a forum with no interest in the merits may have legitimate interests in its own
procedure helps to explain how the Court could so easily dismiss possible constitutional
objections to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after Erie. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941). For decisions upholding state procedural requirements in related
contexts see Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953) (allowing state court to
dismiss action based on foreign law in reliance on local statute of limitations); Missouri ex
rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (allowing state court to dismiss FELA
action on grounds of forum non conveniens).
217 See, e.g., Rodell, Nine Men at 250 (cited in note 6): "with childlike clarity, the citi-
zen saw that the Court had nakedly succumbed to political pressure." Chief Justice Hughes
denied not only that the packing plan had any effect, but also that he had ever changed his
mind. His biographer rosily attributes the apparent switch in judicial attitude to increased
congressional restraint. See Pusey, 2 Charles Evans Hughes at 768, 771 (cited in note 2).
21 See Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. at 73 (cited in note 11), invoking the
1936 election and industrial unrest. Justice Roberts himself pointed to the coercive effect of
public opinion: "it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for
uniform standards. . . for what in effect was a uniform economy.. . . An insistence by the
Court on holding federal power to what seemed its appropriate orbit when the Constitution
was adopted might have resulted in even more radical changes." Owen Josephus Roberts,
The Courts and the Constitution 61-62 (1951). See also McCloskey, The American Supreme
Court at 225 (cited in note 7) ("history, not the Court, made this decision").
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The revolution was often explained in terms of Justice
Holmes's familiar argument of judicial restraint.219 In cases involv-
ing "ordinary commercial transactions," wrote Justice Stone in the
Carolene Products case, "in the absence of statutory findings" sup-
porting the legislative judgment "they would be presumed. 220
This was the deferential approach Brandeis had employed in up-
holding limits on insurance commissions in 1931,221 suggesting
both a respect for the opinions of other branches and what Judge
Cooley had referred to as "conscious[ness] of the fallibility of the
human judgment. '222 Similar considerations underlay Brandeis's
familiar list in the Ashwander case of judicially created doctrines
for avoiding the decision of constitutional questions entirely.223
Other decisions, however, contained little hint of deference to
legislative determinations. Both Parrish and the Labor Board
cases, like Roberts's earlier opinion upholding graduated chain
store taxes,224 ringingly endorsed the reasonableness of the legisla-
tive decision, while the opinion sustaining regulation of employ-
ment agency fees cast doubt on the concept of substantive due pro-
cess itself.225 It may well be that on average the justices of the late
1930s took a more modest view of the judicial function than some
of their predecessors; but they pretty clearly also had a different
view of the substantive provisions they were construing.
Appropriately, it was Justice Stone-perhaps the principal ar-
chitect of the whole revolution-who summed it all up in the most
clairvoyant and best-known footnote in Supreme Court history. No
longer would the Court be much concerned with the controversies
219 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (dissent); F. D. G. Ribble,
Some Aspects of Judicial Self-Restraint, 26 Va. L. Rev. 981 (1940).
220 304 U.S. at 152-53.
222 O'Gorman and Young v. Hartfield Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
222 Thomas M. Cooley, 1 Constitutional Limitations 332 (8th ed. 1927).
223 Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 345-48 (concurrence), quoting Cooley, Constitutional Limi-
tations at 232 (cited in note 222). See also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), where
over the dissents of Butler and McReynolds the Court refused to decide whether a state
could ratify a proposed constitutional amendment after rejecting it and whether it could be
ratified thirteen years after its proposal. Three justices concluded that article V confided the
decision of both questions exclusively to Congress; four others thought this was true of the
entire amendment process and argued with much force that state legislators who had voted
against the amendment had no standing to sue. For criticism of this decision, see Walter
Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 397-98, 411 (1983): "Neither the text of the Constitution nor prior
congressional practice nor judicial precedent supports this bestowal of exclusive power on
Congress."
224 Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931).
225 Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
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over social and economic legislation that had commanded the bulk
of its past attention. In suggesting that the presumption of consti-
tutionality might have less force with respect to measures affecting
specific guarantees like freedom of speech, disadvantaging "dis-
crete and insular minorities," or obstructing "those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation," Stone established the Court's agenda for
the next fifty years.2 26
2" Carolene Products, 304 at 152-53 n.4. See also McCloskey, The American Supreme
Court at 177-79 (cited in note 7); Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times, 1918-
1969 at 169 (1972).
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